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

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THE IMPRECATIONS OF THE PSALTER

Every priest is at times troubled concerning the significance of certain passages of the Psalms which he meets in the daily recitation of the Office. He wonders just what he means when he prays, "Beatus qui tenebit et allidet parvulos tuos ad petram" (Ps. 136:8), "Deleantur de libro viventium, et cum justis non scribantur" (Ps. 68:29), "Cum judicatur exeat condemnatus, et oratio ejus fiat in peccatum" (Ps. 108:7). Even a casual reading of such passages excites an uneasy suspicion that there is a fundamental contradiction between these imprecations, which the priest recites officially as a member of the *ecclesia orans*, and the law of Christian charity as enunciated in Matt. 5:43–45: "You have heard that it was said, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and shalt hate thy enemy.' But I say to you, love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who persecute and calumniate you, so that you may be children of your Father in heaven." And perhaps the priest wonders if, when he arrives at such passages in his breviary, he should not stop praying and simply read.

Such imprecatory passages pose a very nice problem in exegesis and biblical theology. I believe that these observations on the meaning of the imprecatory Psalms will be of interest to priests, particularly at the present time, when we are engaged in a great war; for the difficulty of preaching and explaining the law of Christian charity is felt more keenly in war than in the normal times of peace.

Not long ago the doctrine of hatred was proposed in the *New York Times Magazine* by Mr. Rex Stout—whose renown will repose on his detective stories rather than on this contribution to moral theology. The wide and diversified reaction to Mr. Stout's article is evidence of the deep interest which is felt by all men of all creeds in the problems which his assertions involve. It is not easy for the ordinary citizen, perhaps not easy for the priest trained in theology, to reconcile to his full satisfaction the law of Christian charity and the attitude which, it seems, a nation must adopt if it is to prosecute a successful war—which in modern times means the infliction of political and economic ruin on its adversary. It is no part of my purpose in the present article, which limits itself to biblical theology, to enter into this larger question; but the principles which we apply to the exegesis of the imprecatory

Psalms are of wide application, and not unrelated to the problem of love and hatred in a world at war.

One can draw up a quite extensive list of imprecatory passages in the Psalms, but for practical purposes we need mention only the following: Pss. 68:23-29; 108:6-19; 136:7-8. These are the most difficult passages, and any principles which are valid for the explanation of these may be readily applied to others which are less vigorous in their expression. The moral problem of these passages may be thus stated: does the natural and the Christian law of fraternal charity prohibit the desire for evil to one's neighbor which we find expressed in these Psalms? Is the hatred expressed in these passages in accord with the Gospel precept to love our enemies? There is at least an apparent opposition between the Psalmist and the words of Christ as reported in the Gospels.

Let me make clear at once that no Catholic exegete can admit a truly irreducible contradiction between the Psalms and the Gospels. The dogma of inspiration prohibits the attribution of any kind of error to the inspired writers. Any explanation which is proposed must safeguard this fundamental dogma, and must be judged successful in so far as it does safeguard it. To fail in this respect is to fail in the essential.

The explanation which I propose in this article does not pretend to be novel or original. It may be found more briefly enunciated in many excellent commentaries on the Psalms and in manuals of introduction to the Scriptures. These works, however, are frequently unsatisfactory because they touch this point so briefly, and the true force of the explanation is lost because it is not sufficiently analyzed. It is my purpose here to work out this interpretation of the imprecatory Psalms more at length than is usually done. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to review the more common interpretations of these passages, since many of them contain some element of value for the explanation here set forth.

1. It has been said that the imprecatory Psalms must be understood in the light of the imperfect morality of the Old Testament. It is often, though carelessly, said that things were lawful in the Old Testament which are not lawful in the New. So it is proposed that the imprecations of the Psalms proceed from the less enlightened conscience of the writer.[1]

[1] Cf. Boylan, *The Psalms*, I, lxiv; Pesch, *De Inspiratione Sacrae Scripturae* (1906), p. 455.

This explanation seems not merely inadequate, but positively dangerous to the doctrine of inspiration. We must first of all decide what we mean by imperfect morality: whether we mean morality which is simply good, although less good than a more perfect morality, or a morality which is bad. In the present case the "imperfect morality" of the Old Testament must mean a morality which is bad; for the love of one's enemies is a precept not of the Christian positive law, but of the divine natural law, which was of obligation in the Old Testament no less than in the New.[2] This love of one's enemies is not, of course, that supernatural charity which is distinguished by the name of Christian, but the natural bond which unites the members of the race. While it is true that this precept is not enunciated in its fullness in the Old Testament—which in this sense proposes a less perfect morality—it is not easy to see how we can admit that the Old Testament teaches something positively opposed to the natural law, even if the precept of loving one's enemies is only implicitly contained in the general natural precept of loving one's neighbor. This would be to say that the Old Testament not only fails to propose the highest standard, but actually proposes a false standard; and this we cannot admit in an inspired document. In fact the precept of loving one's enemies is explicit in the Old Testament, as will appear below.

2. It has been suggested that the imprecatory Psalms be explained according to the poetically exaggerated mode of composition found in many of the ancient literary remains of the Babylonians. This explanation has been elaborated at great length in the dissertation of Dr. Franz Übbelohde, *Fluchpsalmen und die Moralität*, which is unfortunately not available to me at the present writing. The literature of the Babylonians and the Assyrians offers numerous examples of prayer-formulae, many of which invoke the gods for the punishment of enemies in terms which remind us of certain imprecatory passages of the Psalms. As an example of such imprecatory formulae a quotation from the magical texts will illustrate what is meant. In this incantation the worshipper is attempting to cast a spell on those who are trying to enchant him:

Now before thy great divinity,
With thy hand have I made of bronze the images of the sorcerer and the sorceress.
Before thee have I placed them and given them into thy charge.

---

[2] Cf. Noldin-Schmitt, *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (1937), II, 86.

Let them die, but let me live,
Let them be under a ban, but let me prosper,
Let them perish, but let me increase,
Let them become weak, but let me wax strong,
O fire god, mighty, exalted among the gods,
Thou that conquerest the evil and the enemy, conquer them and I shall not be destroyed.
May I thy servant live, may I remain secure, may I stand before thy presence . . .
Pronounce my judgment, determine my fate,
Burn the sorcerer and the sorceress.
O fire god, burn the sorcerer and the sorceress!
O fire god, roast the sorcerer and the sorceress!
O fire god, burn them!
O fire god, roast them!
O fire god, overpower them!
O fire god, destroy them!
O fire god, carry them away!
As for those who practice evil sorcery and noxious witchcraft,
Who, with evil purpose, have plotted against me,
Let a strong being take them away,
Deprive them of their property, and
Make the spoiler to lie down in their camps.[3]

These formulae sometimes go on to considerable length. It is suggested that the imprecations of the Psalms are similar formulae, perhaps constructed on the model of the cuneiform prayer-tablets, which mean no more than a general expression of hostility.

We may grant for the sake of discussion that these imprecations are mere formulae and do not mean what they say—although this would be very difficult to demonstrate; but even if this were true, the difficulty would remain. However poetical and exaggerated the expressions used in such formulae, they do express the essence of hatred, which is to wish evil to another. The fact that a person does not wish exactly that evil which the curse-formula expresses does not mean that he does not hate at all. Such cursing formulae are found in modern languages as well as in cuneiform tablets, and it is rarely that they are used with their full force. But surely such an explanation cannot be applied to the inspired writings. We cannot be satisfied with any theory which would merely excuse the inspired writer from grievous sin for lack of sufficient reflection or full consent of the

[3] Rogers, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 151 f.

will, admitting a fault which is less than grievous. This explanation does not touch the heart of the question, which is not the formulae employed, but the hatred which these formulae express. However, the principle which is here invoked, that the exegesis of the Psalms must take account of their literary character, is of considerable value in the solution of the present question.

3. It has been suggested that we are to understand the Psalmist as speaking in the name of the theocratic kingdom of Israel against the national enemies of that kingdom. The enemies of the kingdom of Israel, a divine institution, were also the enemies of God. The Psalmist, as a member of the nation which was joined to God by a special covenant, expresses not personal hatred but national hatred of these enemies.[4]

It may be conceded that in some Psalms the writer speaks of national enemies and not of personal enemies—e. g., Pss. 78 and 82; but this cannot be asserted of all the imprecatory Psalms. In several of these Psalms the common opinion of exegetes is that the imprecations of the Psalmist are directed against his fellow-citizens. This appears to be the only correct interpretation of Pss. 68 and 108, in which the language is more vigorous than in any other Psalm.

But even in those Psalms where the Psalmist speaks in the name of the nation against national enemies, the question remains unsolved. There is no set of national ethics distinct from personal ethics, and the collective unit of the community is bound by the same laws of justice and charity as the individual members of the community. The law of charity is universal in its scope. Yet in the solution which we adopt we shall employ this principle, that the enemies of the Psalmist are the enemies of God. But unless this principle be applied in its fullness, it seems to have no value for solving the question.

4. Some have attempted to mitigate the severity of the imprecatory Psalms by pointing out that the evils which the Psalmist calls down upon his enemies are only temporal in nature.[5] If this is true—and it is disputable—it is also true that the temporal evils which the Psalmist wishes for his enemies are, apparently, the greatest evils which he knows. Nor is the law of charity less severe in prohibiting the imprecation of temporal evil than it is in prohibiting the imprecation of eternal evil. Neither may be desired absolutely for one's enemy.

[4] Cf. Briggs (non-Catholic), *The Book of Psalms* (ICC), I, xcix.

[5] This is one of the numerous suggestions offered in Cornely-Merk, *Compendium Introductionis* (1930), p. 482.

5. The idea that the Psalmist speaks in prophecy and not in imprecation was proposed by many of the Fathers and the older exegetes, and is accepted by some modern exegetes for certain imprecatory passages.[6] This interpretation is proposed by St. Augustine for Ps. 108:

> He [the author of Ps. 108] then beginneth to prophesy what they should receive for their impiety; detailing their lot in such a manner, as if he wished its realization from a desire of revenge; while he declareth what was to happen with the most absolute certainty, and what of God's justice would come upon such worthily. Some not understanding this mode of predicting the future, under the appearance of wishing evil, suppose hatred to be returned for hatred, and an evil will for an evil will. . . . Let us therefore hear the sequel of this divine composition; and in the words of one who seemeth to wish ill, let us recognize the predictions of a prophet.[7]

This explanation is simply not valid for the greater part of the imprecatory passages; and the more common opinion of modern exegetes does not accept it even in Pss. 68 and 108, where the Fathers introduce it. And even if it could be demonstrated for some passages, we should still face the question of the joy which the Psalmist feels and expresses at the evils which are to befall his enemies—a sentiment of hatred which also is prohibited by the law of charity.

6. A brief mention will suffice for the theory proposed by a few exegates that some of the imprecations in the Psalms are not the words of the Psalmist himself, but are quotations of the words of another. Ps. 108 will serve as an example. In 2-5 the Psalmist describes the opposition of his enemies; 6–19 would then be understood as the words of the enemies expressing their hatred of the Psalmist; and in 20–31 the Psalmist resumes with a prayer for deliverance.[8]

Few exegetes have accepted this interpretation, as it seems to force the text. And even if it be accepted as probable in some Psalms, there remain other passages equally difficult where it cannot possibly be applied. Herkenne's proposal that Ps. 108:6–19 are spoken as the words of God Himself is merely a modification of the same view, and is no more acceptable.[9]

[6] So Callan and McHugh, *The Psalms Explained*, for Ps. 108 (*ad loc.*).

[7] *Enarrationes in Psalmos, in Ps. 108.* The translation is taken from Newman's edition of the *Library of the Fathers.*

[8] So Boylan, *The Psalms*, (*ad loc.*).

[9] Herkenne, *Das Buch der Psalmen*, (*ad loc.*).

This brief review of the theories which have been proposed to explain the imprecatory Psalms shows that while some of the solutions offered may be applied to particular passages, no single solution nor all of them together can be applied to those passages in which the Psalmist appears to imprecate, simply and without qualification, the most extreme evils upon those who are his personal enemies. Such passages, according to the more common view of exegetes, are Pss. 68 and 108. And unless some other explanation be offered, one must ultimately arrive at the interpretation of these passages suggested by Dr. Übbelohde in the dissertation mentioned above—an interpretation which demands a more extensive treatment.

7. Dr. Übbelohde examines each of the imprecatory passages in detail, and proposes a particular solution in each case, wherever this is possible; but in those passages where no particular solution can be applied, he has recourse to the concept of biblical inspiration. Biblical inspiration is a divine impulse to *write*, not to think or to feel. The mental and emotional processes of the author do not take place under the influence of inspiration except in so far as they enter into the actual composition of the book. If the author merely records his past experiences, we cannot affirm that these experiences occurred under divine inspiration; and their record in an inspired book is in itself no assurance that these experiences are free from error or sin. They are to be interpreted according to the same principles by which we interpret any Scriptural narrative of an event or of the words of some person other than the author; and the author is not presumed to approve of the words or actions narrated merely because he passes no moral judgment.

The content of such narratives is the word of God *ratione consignationis*; the narrative or record is inspired, but not the transactions which are contained therein.[10] In this hypothesis, then, the imprecations expressed by the Psalmist are merely recorded as past or present sentiments, with no approving (or disapproving) judgment attached, and they are inspired in the same sense as the speech of Rabsaces in 4 Kings 18:19–35; and theologians are free to weigh them

[10] "Cum hagiographus hic *iudicet* hos affectus suos adfuisse vel adesse, hoc iudicium est etiam iudicium Dei . . . De *honestate* affectuum *praeteritorum* ex inspiratione nihil sequitur; si agitur de *praesentibus*, per se et ratione solius inspirationis possunt a rectitudine morali deficere (cum non sint iudicia), quamquam in concreto 'videtur difficile hagiographum exsistentiam affectus actualiter ab ipso habiti testari quin eo ipso eum aliquomodo approbet' (Fernandez), id quod, si agitur de affectu malo, cum inspiratione conciliari nequit." Bea, *De Inspiratione*, p. 57.

on their own merits and, if it seems necessary, to pass a judgment of moral disapproval—as Dr. Übbelohde does.

This explanation is not as easily rejected as others. On the other hand, it is too bold to win many adherents. While it cuts more cleanly to the heart of the question than other explanations, and rests on the solid theological doctrine of inspiration, it is not altogether free from danger. The metaphysically possible may be psychologically impossible. A man's record of his own sentiments, especially of his present sentiments, is not the same as his record of the sentiments of another. In the concrete, according to the caution of Father Fernandez, it is difficult to see how a man can record his own present sentiments without in some way approving them; for to consent to these feelings is to approve them.[11] And the Psalmist does consent to the feeling of hatred of his enemies. If we can trust language as a medium of communication, he is not recording what he is tempted to feel, but what he actually and deliberately does feel. To suppose that he can write down these sentiments without at the same time expressing his consent to them appears to involve a psychological contradiction. Hence it seems necessary to reject this interpretation also.

Before presenting the interpretation offered here, we should recall that the question is not merely one of the imprecatory Psalms; it touches other books of the Bible, not only in the Old Testament but also in the New. For the Old Testament it is sufficient to cite the imprecations found in Jeremias 11:20; 18:19–23. In reading the New Testament texts we should recall what has been remarked above: that the difficulty lies not in mere imprecatory formulae, but in the sentiment of hatred which these formulae express. Let us note the words of St. Paul when the high priest ordered him to be struck: "God will strike thee, thou whitewashed wall" (Acts 23:1–6). This is not prayer for them that hated and persecuted him. The difficult text of 1 Tim. 1:19–20 is also to the point: "Some. . . have made shipwreck of the faith, among whom are Hymeneus and Alexander, whom I have delivered up to Satan that they may learn not to blaspheme." He heaps no coals of fire on the head of an enemy in 2 Tim. 4:14: "Alexander the coppersmith has done me much harm; the Lord will render to him according to his deeds." Or read the splendid invective against the rich in James 5:1–6 ("Come now, you rich, weep and howl over your miseries which will come upon you. . ."), and see whether it expresses hatred of sin but love of the sinner. Finally, we may

[11] Cf. *Institutiones Biblicae*, I, 468.

notice the prayer of the saints for their enemies in Apoc. 6:9–10: "I saw under the altar the souls of those who had been slain for the word of God, and the witness that they bore. And they called with a loud voice, saying, 'How long, O Lord (holy and true), dost thou refrain from judging and avenging our blood on those who dwell on the earth?'" Clearly these texts are not be be explained from the imperfection of Old Testament morality.

Nor did Christ our Lord abstain from strong language about His enemies. His precept to His Apostles on their first mission included this charge: "Whoever does not receive you, nor listen to your words—go forth outside that house or town, and shake off the dust from your feet" (Matt. 10:14). A stronger expression of reprobation could hardly be desired. He condemns the unrepentant cities: "Woe to thee, Corozain! Woe to thee, Bethsaida! . . . I tell you, it will be more tolerable for the land of Sodom on the day of judgment than for thee" (Matt. 11:21–24). To rank a city lower than Sodom, that proverbial example of divine reprobation, is not to exhibit love for it. He speaks contemptuously of Herod as "that fox" (Luke 13:32), the obstinate unbelief of the Pharisees rouses His anger (Mark 3:5), He calls them "a brood of vipers" (Matt. 12:34), and delivers against them the unsurpassed masterpiece of invective related in Matt. 23:13–39. "You also fill up the measure of your fathers. Serpents, brood of vipers, how are you to escape the judgment of hell? Therefore I send you prophets, and wise men, and scribes; and some of them you will put to death, and crucify, and some you will scourge in your synagogues, and persecute from town to town; that upon you may come all the just blood that has been shed upon the earth. . ." (Matt. 23:32–35). Now the strange feature of this whole problem is that most readers will see no difficulty in these texts, which, whatever their meaning, express anything but tender affection, and will wonder why I quote them; and that is because by habit they adjust these texts to New Testament teaching. I do not pretend that these passages can be cited as parallel to the imprecatory Psalms; but I do maintain that if these utterances of Christ and His Apostles were judged by the severe "New Testament" standards which are usually applied to the imprecatory Psalms, they would have to be judged intemperate—at least. The same judgment would have to be passed on the Collect against persecutors and evildoers found in the Missal: "Crush, we beseech Thee, O Lord, the pride of our enemies; and humble their insolence by the might of Thy hand;" and the Collect of the Mass

Contra Paganos (observe the title): "Almighty and everlasting God, in whose hand are the power and the government of every nation; look to the help of the Christian people, that the heathen nations, who trust to the fierceness of their own might, may be crushed by the power of Thy right arm."

The question, then, in the last analysis, is reduced to this: are the standards applied to the imprecatory Psalms too severe? Does the law of charity forbid all hatred and all expression of hatred? For practical purposes we can define hatred as the sentiment by which we regard a person as evil and wish him evil. Moralists distinguish the *odium abominationis* and the *odium inimicitiae*.[12] The *odium inimicitiae* is directed against the person himself, and is in itself a grave sin. The *odium abominationis*, on the other hand, is directed not at the person but at some evil quality of the person; the person is hated only in so far as the person is evil, while the *odium inimicitiae* is directed at the person regardless of good or evil. If the quality is truly evil (and therefore hateful), this hatred is altogether free from sin, unless it exceeds the measure of justice or passes into hatred of the person himself. Nor is it sinful in this case to wish that the person receive the evil which corresponds to his evil quality, as long as it is not desired precisely as evil for the person (which would be the sentiment of *odium inimicitiae*), but as something which is, in some respects, good. Thus law-abiding citizens consent to the execution of a murderer not because of the pleasure his killing gives them, but because his death restores the order of justice which his crime has violated. So, as American citizens, we rejoice at the victories of our armed forces; not because of our glee at blood-letting, but because by these victories our nation is defended against its enemies. And we would not carry on the war if we did not regard our enemies as evil and desire efficaciously to inflict evil upon them. This is a species of hatred.

Now the hatred of the Psalmist is certainly directed against a hateful quality: sin. If the *odium abominationis* is ever lawful, it is certainly lawful where the supreme moral evil is concerned. Yet it is just because the Psalmist hates sinners that people find difficulty in his words—where we would be, it seems, most ready to grant him some latitude. Few, I imagine, will care for the manner in which Dr. Bird treats the question: "There is a modern fallacy of hating the

[12] Cf. Noldin-Schmitt, *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (1937), II, 104; Merkelbach, *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (1938), I, 720 f; Genicot-Salsmans, *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis* (1939), I, 176 f.

sin and loving the sinner."[13] Yet it is true that sin as an abstraction has no existence. The sin which we hate has its concrete existence in human wills. It is not a disease or a misfortune; it is a deliberately induced evil which a man brings upon himself by the perversion of his highest faculties, the powers which constitute him in the image and likeness of God. It is the action of a man as a man, as a free moral agent; it is the expression of his personality, it makes him the kind of man he is. It is a rebellion against the supreme Goodness and Truth and Beauty, an attempt to destroy God's dominion—and thereby His very existence. We cannot love a man for this, and the love we have for sinners we have in spite of this tremendous obstacle. We love them not for what they are, but for what they can be. No one has explained this better than St. Thomas. To the question whether we ought to love sinners out of charity, he answers:

> Two things may be considered in the sinner, his nature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based . . . wherefore we ought to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature. On the other hand, their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or mother. . . . For it is our duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, for God's sake.[14]
>
> Love of one's enemies may be understood in three ways. First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is perverse, and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that which is evil in another. Secondly, love of one's enemies may mean that we love them as to their nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbour, we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbour in general. Thirdly love of one's enemies may be considered as specially directed to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of love towards our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely . . . . [but] in respect of our being prepared in mind, namely that we should be ready to love our enemies individually, if the necessity were to occur.[15]

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[13] Bird, *The Psalms*, II, 377. This single citation hardly does justice to Dr. Bird, to whose book I am more indebted than to any other source for the material of this article.

[14] *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 25, a. 6, c. These passages are quoted from the translation of the English Dominican Fathers.

[15] *Ibid.*, q. 25, a. 8, c.

Everything naturally hates its contrary as such. Now our enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself should be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They are not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness: and it is as such that we are bound to love them.[16]

To the question whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin, St. Thomas answers:

Hatred is opposed to love . . . so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbour in respect of what he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in respect of sin and lack of justice. Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him, since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his evil. Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it simply, is always sinful.[17]

God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his nature; so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.[18]

Men are not opposed to us in respect of the good which they have received from God; wherefore, in this respect, we should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are hostile to us.[19]

We may conclude from these passages that there is a lawful hatred of the sinner; and indeed there must be, since such a hatred is the obverse of the love of God. The love of God hates all that is opposed to God; and sinners—not merely sin—are opposed to God. And if such a sentiment is lawful, its expression is lawful; and one may desire that the evil in another receive its corresponding evil—provided that this hatred is restrained within the limits of that which is lawful. These limits are: 1. Hatred must not be directed at the *person* of one's neighbor; he is hated *for his evil quality*. 2. One may desire that the divine justice be accomplished in the sinner; but it must be a desire for divine justice, not a desire for the personal evil of another out of personal revenge. 3. The infliction of evil may not be desired ab-

[16] Ibid., q. 25, a. 8, ad 2.
[17] *Ibid.*, q. 34, a. 3, c.
[18] *Ibid.*, q. 34, a. 3, ad 2.
[19] *Ibid.*, q. 34, a. 3, ad 3.

solutely, but only under the condition that the sinner remains obdurate and unrepentant. 4. It must be accompanied by that true supernatural charity which efficaciously desires the supreme good—the eternal happiness—of all men in general, not excluding any individual who is capable of attaining it. In a word, the sinner may lawfully be hated only when he is loved. The Christian is expected to imitate the divine perfection in this as in other things; and, by the paradoxical greatness of the divine perfection God's, justice punishes sin with eternal reprobation while at the same time His mercy does not spare the only-begotten Son of the Father in order to save those who have sinned.

Some such sentiment, I imagine, was present in the heart of St. John the Apostle when, if the story be true, he hurriedly abandoned the baths where he met the heretic Cerinthus, lest the building collapse under a sudden flash of God's anger. So likewise we may understand the story which the breviary relates of St. Polycarp, who, when asked by the heretic Marcion whether Polycarp recognized him, answered, "I recognize the first-born of the devil." And so also I understand the New Testament texts which I have quoted above. This hatred of the sinner for his sins appears here as a very real sentiment; yet we cannot doubt that these men at the very same time desired nothing more than the salvation of those whom as enemies of God they abhorred. What they desire is the accomplishment either of God's plans for salvation or, failing this because of human perversity, the satisfaction of his justice. And this is to wish what God wishes.

So also we may interpret the imprecatory Psalms. The hatred of the sinner which they express, if it remains within the limits of the law of charity, is lawful; and the evil which the Psalmist desires for the sinner is no more than the satisfaction of divine justice, and no more than God will actually inflict upon those who persevere in their sin. The only difference between the Psalms and the expressions of the New Testament is the vigorous language of the Psalmist, which may cause some doubt as to whether the conditions laid down above are actually fulfilled. Even if there were no texts to show this, we ought to give the Psalmist the benefit of the doubt. The Psalms are poetry; their language and conception is poetic, and we should not expect a poet to speak with the metaphysical precision of the theologian. Biblical poetry, like poetry in other literatures, expresses itself by the imaginative and figurative elaboration of a single theme. This single theme, in the imprecatory Psalms, is the accomplishment of the

divine justice upon sinners who are presumed to be unrepentant. The Psalmist elaborates his theme by a very graphic portrayal of the evils which Divine Providence inflicts upon sinners. According to the thought of his time the Psalmist includes such things as the sudden death of the sinner and the impoverishment and destruction of his family through his sins, and the horrors of Oriental warfare, in which not infrequently infants were dashed against stones. But that which the Psalmist desires is the fulfillment of divine justice, and he cannot be charged with sin because he employs literary devices to express this desire.[20]

These imprecatory passages must not be understood without reference to the general teaching of the Old Testament. And no Catholic exegete denies that in the general teaching of the Old Testament the love of the sinner which desires his highest good is clearly expressed.[21] We do no violence to the text of the Psalms when we suppose that the hatred which the Psalmist expresses is to be understood against this background. And at the same time it is not necessary to struggle against the obvious sense of the imprecatory passages; the Psalmist regards his enemies as evil and wishes them evil—but within the limits of the law of charity.

Let us apply these principles to our test cases, Pss. 68:23–29; 108:6–19; 136:7–8; for, as I have observed above, a satisfactory explanation of these passages can be easily applied to any other imprecatory passage. We can and must assume that the Psalmist is not venting personal spite, but is expressing hatred of the sinner for his wickedness; for no other cause of hatred is assigned. We must assume likewise, according to other Old Testament texts, that the Psalmist desires that the sinner turn from his evil ways and live. But the

[20] St. Thomas suggests this as one of the interpretations of the imprecatory passages: "Suchlike imprecations may be understood . . . by way of wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the man's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to Ps. 57:11: 'The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge,' since according to Wisd. 1:13, not even God 'hath pleasure in the destruction of the wicked' when He punishes them, but He rejoices in His justice" (II-II, q. 25, a. 6, ad 3).

[21] A full treatment of this doctrine would require an article in itself. The following texts may be cited: love of one's neighbor, including one's enemy, is prescribed in Exod. 23:4–5; Lev. 19:17–18; Prov. 10:12, 24:17. Sinners are invited to repentance in Isa. 1:17; Jer. 3:12–14; Ezech. 18:23, 33:11; Ps. 24:8. The Psalmist envisages himself as an agent in the conversion of sinners, Ps. 50:15. The Book Of Jonas exhibits God's merciful providence even towards those inveterate enemies of the Hebrews, the Assyrians.

Psalmist does not express these sentiments in the passages under discussion. For the purpose of his composition—which may be to represent the malice of sin in such a way as to deter others from committing sin—he describes these sinners as impenitent and obdurate, and expresses his desire that such sin receive the full measure of justice. And in this, as I have already observed, he desires no more than the divine justice actually inflicts upon the sinner. But, as a poet, he does not express a mere acquiescence to divine justice, but in a concrete style depicts the evils which God brings upon the sinner. In Ps. 68 he describes how creatures themselves become a snare of perdition to those who are bent on sin; how, by the mysterious divine permission of evil, the mind and heart are blinded and crippled by perverse habits; how guilt is heaped upon guilt by further sins, issuing in the final rupture between God and His creature. All this will certainly come upon the unrepentant, and it is the Psalmist's desire that it come.

In Ps. 108 the sinner is depicted as the defendant in a trial before an unjust judge, his adversary at his right hand where his friend should be; in such a court his very plea for himself only adds to his guilt. The obdurate sinner is in an equally hopeless case when he tries to escape divine justice. The totality of his disaster is seen by the fall of his family and household, which, in the ancient Orient, shared the guilt and punishment of the culprit. The evil which he inflicted on others shall rest as a curse on him, clothing him like a garment. In this imaginative portrayal of the fall of a man from his high estate—less, surely, than the reality which it represents—the Psalmist exhibits the divine punishment of the impenitent sinner. Graphic as these descriptions are, they are nothing more than an elaborate literary invocation of the divine justice—a lawful invocation, as long as it is not a desire of personal revenge which excludes the desire that the sinner repent. The assumption that the sinner is obdurate is a literary device and by no means excludes this desire; but the Psalmist also really desires all these evils for the sinner who remains impenitent.

The brief but pointed imprecation of Ps. 136:7–8 is likewise a picturesque and poetic fashion of voicing the desire that the nation which afflicted Israel may fall. The dashing of infants against stones is a macabre touch drawn from Oriental warfare, and was to be expected at the fall of a beleaguered city; the Psalmist, in desiring the fall of the city, almost necessarily includes such horrors. Those who do this are, in the mind of the Psalmist, "*beati*" in the very limited sense of being unwitting instruments of divine justice, and are not

thereby excused from the guilt of their own crimes. Behind the figure is the true sense of the Psalmist, which is a desire of divine vengeance for the crimes of the wicked. In committing all vengeance to God the Psalmist excludes personal revenge, and acquiesces in the operations of God's justice and mercy towards those who are by their sins God's—and his—enemies.

It may appear to some that such passages do not offer a model of conduct for Christians; but the question is not whether the Psalmist exhibits the perfection of evangelical charity, but whether his utterances are free from sin. This much, at least, I have been at pains to establish. But, on further reflection, does it not appear possible that the imprecatory Psalms are not a model, not because of their lower degree of perfection, but because they are too lofty for most of us to imitate them without danger? We do not recommend to ordinary Christians the frightful austerities of the Saints. In a similar fashion, perhaps such a vehement hatred is a luxury which can be afforded only by great lovers of God. We lesser souls are well aware that a sincere zeal is a rare treasure, and that much which is ugly and vengeful may mask itself as zeal for the honor of God. We may not choose to recommend these words of the Psalmist as an expression of our sentiments about our enemies or about any sinners—even though they be lawful—because we know that a disinterested hatred is not only as difficult to attain as a disinterested love, but also attended with greater dangers of self-deception. But while we understand this, we may also regret the imperfect attachment to God which keeps us from hating sin as it should be hated; and we may recall that love of the sinner arises from mere human sympathy as well as from disinterested Christian charity. And when we recite these Psalms as a part of the official prayer of the Church, we may recite them with all fervor in the sense intended by the Holy Spirit who inspired them and the Church which offers them through us.

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FROM VESTURE TO VESTMENTS

The history of the evolution of liturgical vestments is usually divided into four periods, though there are indications that at the present day we are entering upon a fifth stage in the development of ceremonial costume. The first period, extending into the fourth century, was that in which no distinctive vestments were worn at divine service, garments of the type used in ordinary life serving for the liturgical *synaxes* also, though as far as possible newer clothes, of more ornate fashion, were reserved for ecclesiastical functions. The second period, from the time of Constantine the Great to about the eighth century, marked the introduction of special liturgical vestments, to be worn exclusively in church over the daily attire of the priest and his attendants. It remained for the third period, that beginning with the eighth and extending into the thirteenth century, to develop the elaboration of eccelesiastical vestments as distinctive insignia of various orders of the clergy and their restriction to definite classes of liturgical functions. The fourth period, in which we still live, may be called the age of decadence, marked by not-too-happy changes in the form and ornamentation of the vestments of late medieval times. Perhaps we are now on the threshold of a fifth period, one of reaction against the Roccoco and minimizing deformations of the past three centuries.

The thesis is no longer defended that the vestments of the Christian Church are an evolution of the priestly dress of the Old Testament. It is much more likely that our liturgical garments represent a development from the secular clothing of classic antiquity. Hence, it is generally held that, in the primitive Church, the dress of daily life was worn for the celebration of Mass, though no doubt better garments were reserved for exclusive use at the altar. So, St. Paul, as a Roman citizen, officiated in his toga and St. Peter was content with his more plebian cloak. Fundamentally, the ordinary garments for all classes were an under-tunic, sometimes sleeveless and knee-length, and an outer mantle, and these two have survived in liturgical vestments as the alb and the chasuble. A purple stripe was woven in the toga which the priest of pagan Rome wore when officiating and it is tempting to think that some such distinguishing mark on the ordinary garment of the Christian priest was the first step in the direction of definite ecclesiastical dress. What pictures we have, however, of

the period of the catacombs, represent the officiant at sacred rites in his unadorned every-day dress. So, it remained for the period following the persecutions to develop civil vesture into Church vestments.

The four centuries following that of Constantine introduced special vestments, fundamentally those which are still in use, to be worn exclusively in church over the daily attire of the priest and his ministers. Naturally, there has been decided development in the form and use of liturgical garments since the era of their introduction. The first chapter in the history of vestments was the separation of ritual garments from the articles of dress used in secular life. This was mainly effected by the retention of the antique style of tunic and cloak, after the fashions had changed, as the proper garb to be worn only in church and for the performance of acts of divine worship. Gradually, ceremonial adjuncts, originally for utilitarian reasons, were added to the fundamental elements of the ancient dress which had been preserved as ceremonial vesture. Thus, the band which confined the tunic about the waist became the liturgical cincture, and the cuffs which bound the flowing sleeves of the tunic developed into the *epimanikia* of Oriental vestments. The progress seems to have been more a matter of custom than of eccelesiastical legislation and to have been more rapid in the Eastern than in the Western Church.

Apparently, the first ornament to be added to the fundamental tunic and cloak as a liturgical vestment was the pallium or stole. The use of the disjunctive conjunction *or* is not here meant to indicate that the words *pallium* and *stole* were originally synonymous terms for the same ecclesiastical garment but that the pallium and stole were not, in olden times worn together by the same person. In the famous sixth century mosaic in the church of San Vitale, Ravenna, the Archbishop, Maximilian, is shown with the pallium draped around his shoulders over the chasuble but no stole appears as worn beneath the outer vestment. When the *Ordo Romanus Primus*, of the late eighth century, enumerates the liturgical garments in which the Pope is vested for Mass, no stole is mentioned but the pallium is named to be put on after the *planeta*. Both pallium and stole were primitively broad, rectangular pieces of cloth folded to something like their present width. The origin of the pallium is no longer traced to the mantle which St. Peter wore as the symbol of his supreme jurisdiction but to the adaptation of the pontifical *omophorion* of the Eastern Church, chosen by the Pope as the badge of his supreme priesthood. So,

the pallium was first a distinctly Papal vestment, which was later extended to bishops other than the Bishop of Rome as a special concession of the latter.

The stole was also, in its original form, a folded piece of cloth, long and broad. No one now holds the once prevalent theory that the stole is the remnant of an ancient mantle, also called "stole," and is the ornamental band which alone remained after the disappearance of the garment of which it was the decoration. The stole is now traced to a liturgical napkin, which deacons formerly carried, or to a cloth, folded to be worn around the neck by priests, whence its ancient name, *orarium*. The designation of the garment as a "stole" is said to be of Gallic origin, passing from the Frankish Empire into Italy and there rapidly supplanting the term *orarium*, so that the latter word has been obsolete in the West since the thirteenth century. At all events, this liturgical adjunct arose in the East and was first adopted as a distinctive badge of the clergy of Rome, before becoming a mark of the higher orders throughout the Western Church. It has been for centuries one of the chief liturgical vestments, both in the Oriental rites and in the liturgy of the West. In the ninth and tenth centuries, at least in the Frankish Empire, the use of the stole was not restricted to church services but was worn by priests in ordinary attire as a mark of their office, a medieval equivalent of the present-day Roman collar as an identifying bit of sacerdotal uniform.

The maniple, which is, curiously enough, in view of its humble origin the one vestment worn at Mass and nowhere else, was, like the pallium and the stole, in its primitive form, a folded piece of cloth, though of less ample dimensions. Its original name, *mappula* or *sudarium*, indicates its practical, though unesthetic, purpose,—namely, to wipe the face. Even in classic, pre-Christian, times such a cloth was used as an ornamental handkerchief, to be carried in the hand as an elegant appendage, never to come in contact with facial perspiration, just as to-day the breast-pocket handkerchief remains as an ornament, not to be employed for any sordid use. Juvenal (XI, 191) relates how the magistrate, of Roman times, carried such a ceremonial handkerchief, which he used as a signal when presiding over the public games. At first restricted to Rome, where it was worn as a bit of liturgical dress as early as the sixth century, the maniple was found throughout Western Europe three centuries later. Its use extended even to acolytes and, in some instances, to lay brothers, assisting in choir at solemn functions. When the subdiaconate de-

veloped into a higher order, beginning with the eleventh century, the wearing of the maniple became confined to those in sacred orders and somewhat later its use was restricted to Mass, as is the rule to-day.

The amice, which is the first of the sacerdotal insignia, in the order of vesting, was the last to be added to the list of liturgical garments to be worn at Mass. Perhaps, when the stole ceased to be a sacerdotal neckcloth, the amice was introduced as a kind of muffler to protect the throat. The prayer which is recited when the sub-deacon, at his ordination, is invested with the amice, refers to it as signifying *castigatio vocis* and so would indicate the origin of the vestment as a scarf for the protection of the throat. On the other hand, the prayer appointed to be said when the priest puts on the amice for the celebration of Mass calls it *galeam salutis*, thus identifying it as a head covering. Both ideas are involved in the investiture with the amice of the sub-deacon, at his ordination, the vestment being first drawn over his head before being left to encircle his neck. A very utilitarian purpose is also served by the amice as it protects the precious material of the chasuble from soiling contact with the skin of the back of the neck. The amice was for centuries a head-covering, worn, as it is still in monastic orders, in going to and from the altar and in general as the predecessor of the clerical biretta. A vestige of this original use survives in the direction of the rubrics that the amice be first touched to the head before it is adjusted about the neck and shoulders when the priest is vesting for the celebration of Mass.

All the vestments just named, and several others, were introduced during the second period in the history of liturgical costume during which every-day vesture was transformed into ecclesiastical vestments. The third era, in the development of ritual garments, extends from the ninth to the thirteenth century and reflects, in ceremonial garments, the elaboration of the simple rites of the early Church into the complex liturgy of mid-medieval and subsequent times. Different orders of the clergy acquired a definite right to certain insignia. The chasuble ceased to be the outer garment, worn indiscriminately by all ranks from prelate to acolyte. The stole and the maniple were restricted in use. The dalmatic, at first reserved to the Pope and his Roman deacons, became the characteristic diaconal vestment everywhere in the West. A somewhat modified form of the dalmatic, known as the tunicle, was adopted as the customary vestment of the sub-deacon. The raincloak, the *pluviale*, originally destined for protection during outdoor processions, was transformed into the ceremonial cope to be worn

at functions outside of Mass. The alb, from the eleventh century on, began to be replaced by a similar garment, the surplice, for use by those assisting at, but not officiating in sacred ceremonies. Pontifical vestments for the exculsive use of bishops received their full development during this third period of the evolution of liturgical dress. The episcopal dalmatic, first worn by the Pope alone under his chasuble, was gradually extended to all bishops. It became the custom, in the beginning in Rome alone, and from the twelfth century generally throughout the lands of the Roman rite, to wear under the dalmatic a vestment of similar form, known as the tunic, so that both became elements of pontifical regalia. The mitre, for centuries so prominent a feature of episcopal dress, does not date from beyond the tenth century. Authorities trace its origin to a cap, the *camelaucum*, a non-liturgical Papal head-dress, which was worn no earlier than the eighth century. The late eighth-century *Ordo Romanus Primus* enumerates all the vestments to be put on by the Pope for the celebration of Mass but fails to name any covering for the head. The mitral development of the Papal *camelaucum* came during the tenth century, when the Pope began to wear this head-dress not merely during the processions to and from the church but also during certain periods of the Mass itself. From Rome and the Bishop of Rome the use of the mitre was extended all through Western Europe but it was not until the first half of the twelfth century that the custom of wearing the mitre became quite general among bishops of the Roman rite. The introduction of the pontifical gloves and of the sandals and buskins belongs to that multiplication of episcopal insignia which was the result of the growth in secular importance of bishops during the era of the Carlovingians.

The fourth period in the evolution of liturgical vestments begin after the thirteenth century and still perdures, though there are present-day indications of a reaction to its bad taste. For this period may be called one of decadence. Just as in architecture the pure and simple forms of the early Renaissance degenerated into the fantastic excesses of the Roccoco, so were church vestments affected by the pigtail and periwig fashions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and reached their nadir in the mass production of tasteless ecclesiastical dress of the nineteenth and our own centuries. The alb began to be ornamented with lace, which started modestly as an edging but ended by reducing the linen portion of the vestment to a short coat. The stole and maniple were widened at the ends to furnish surface for

embroidery and other ornamentation, often of extravagant character. The chasuble suffered most, being curtailed and slit so that of the ample garment completely enveloping the wearer and hanging in graceful folds from his shoulders we have now remaining two stiff "sandwich boards" scarcely the width of a monastic scapular and by no means the length of one. The stole has also been dwarfed so that when crossed on the breast of the celebrant it hardly reaches below the cincture, especially in the case of priests whose personal architecture is more Roman than Gothic. The cope has become little more than a quadrant of material and its hood has degenerated into a cape, which furnishes another field for not-too-felicitous decoration. The dalmatic, originally a rich coat of dignified proportions, has lost its sleeves and shrunk to the size of a juvenile herald's tabard. On the other hand, the mitre has grown from a low fillet to a towering cap which rarely enhances the impressive appearance of its episcopal wearer. The pontifical tunic and dalmatic have yielded to utilitarian pressure to the extent of becoming garments of shirt-like aspect, though the Roman *fornitori* have managed to preserve most of the pristine shape of these vestments without unduly increasing their bulk. The surplice has outdistanced the alb in surrender to the decadent influences which transform simple linen robes to unduly elaborate lace coats. The surplice went the whole way, becoming entirely lace, reducing itself almost to waist-length and shortening its sleeves to the maximum of an elbow terminus. By attraction, the humeral veil, except in its Roman form, has contracted to a narrow scarf, perhaps ample enough for the subdeacon holding the paten but too trivial for the priest carrying the Blessed Sacrament in solemn procession.

Happily, there is to-day a reaction against these minimizing deformations of ritual garments, as a part of the general revival of good taste in all departments of art, especially in architecture and furniture. So, the alb is again becoming a linen garment on which lace, if used at all, is in its proper place as ornamentation. The maniple and stole are regaining their dignified medieval cut. The chasuble is expanding from the narrow boards, swung fore and aft, to something more like the generous and flowing vestment of the third period of liturgical vesture. The cope is acquiring the perimeter of at least a semi-circle and is substituting a rudimentary hood for the pendant cape. Pontifical ornaments have felt the reforming influence also. Lower mitres are more common, dalmatic and tunic are more like vestments and less like shifts, and even the *gremiale* is becoming an ample rectangle

rather than a mere apron. The mass-production, which short-circuited artistic construction and full-size patterns in the making of vestments, is giving place more and more to the tailoring of liturgical garments by individuals and parish sewing-societies, whose work is careful and reverent and, given proper direction, artistic.

It is true that a decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, dated December 9, 1925, forbade the introduction of any innovation in the accepted style of vestments, even in favor of a more ancient design, without previous consultation with the Holy See. To what extent the Bishops of the world have communicated with Rome on this matter we do not know but the more general vogue of the so-called Gothic chasuble, with at least the tacit permission of the Most Reverend Ordinaries and evidently of the Holy See as well, would indicate that nothing authoritative has been done to halt the present-day return to simplicity and dignity in liturgical vesture. However, with no departure whatever from the *usus receptus*, albs can be linen garments and not lace skirts, maniples and stoles can expand beyond Lilliputian dimensions, and the chasuble, without returning to its very ample medieval proportions, can conform to the Roman model, which certainly should represent the accepted pattern, becoming fifty percent wider than the chasuble formerly so commonly seen, and draping over the shoulders, though not to the extent of the *soi-disant* Gothic form. No consultation with the Sacred Congregation is required to use linen, and not lace, except for subordinate decoration, for surplices, or to construct copes so that they will be enveloping cloaks and not dorsal capes which will not join anteriorly on the slimmest priest.

"The priest clad in sacred vestments," writes the author of the *Following of Christ*, "is Christ's vicegerent that he may suppliantly and humbly pray to God for himself and all the people." The sacerdotal dress at the altar should reflect the dignity and good taste which are so definitely indicated in all that regards the supreme act of public worship. There should be nothing to occasion *admiratio populi* not only by reason of the unaccustomed form of the vestments worn but also by reason of the frivolous and truncated character of the liturgical dress, whatever apologies may be made for it by the prescription of years of decadent taste. Prayers and ceremonies, vestments and utensils, are all as so many stones which combine to form the great mosaic of Christian worship.

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LEGAL PRICES

The abnormal conditions brought about by the war have given rise to a considerable number of problems which are by no means easy of solution, even though the relevant principles are unanimously accepted by theologians. One of these problems, having very practical bearings in the United States, is this: Is there an obligation in conscience to obey the laws regulating prices and similar governmental restrictions concerning buying and selling, rationing, etc.? There is a tendency on the part of persons not sufficiently familiar with theological teachings to settle this problem quite simply and definitively with the sweeping statement that all such civil enactments are purely penal laws. Writing in *The Irish Ecclesiastical Record* for October, 1943, The Rev. John McCarthy, D.D., unhesitatingly rejects this view. "The theologians unanimously teach that the legal price is the just price, and that it binds strictly in conscience. . . He would indeed be greatly daring, we could say temerarious, who would publicly hold against the unanimous tradition that one is not bound in conscience to observe the legal price, that the fixed price regulations are purely penal. It is our view that the legal price not merely binds in conscience, but that it binds in strict or commutative justice."

The Rev. M. Mansfield, S. J., discussing the same problem in *The Irish Ecclesiastical Record* for May, 1944, agrees with the general principle that the legal price binds in justice. However, he admits as an exception the case of the seller who finds that the legal "ceiling" price does not come up to the minimum amount at which the article is valued at the time and in the place of sale, according to common estimate. "This *aestimatio communis* or *pretium naturale* corresponds to what economists call the normal price, or that price which, without prejudice to any particular theory of value is just sufficient to cover ordinary expenses of production, including whatever is necessary to induce men to undertake the risks of productive enterprise." When the legal price is below this common estimate, Father Mansfield would not consider it a violation of justice for the seller to demand more than governmental regulations allow.

The Rev. R. C. Jancauskis, S.J., writing in *The Homiletic and Pastoral Review* for May and June of the current year, also agrees with the

general principle that legally determined prices impose an obligation in conscience, but adds further qualifications and remarks. He argues that even in the event that the legal price does not sufficiently compensate the seller, it still imposes an obligation in conscience for the sake of the common good (to avert the evil of inflation), as long as it does not impose an excessive hardship on the seller. "An inadequate price does bind in conscience, not according to commutative justice, but according to legal justice, if the loss is not unreasonable and if the goal for which the loss is taken is worth while."

Father Jancauskis also essays to set down an absolute sum that would constitute a grave violation of legal justice by sellers who demand prices above the "ceiling." He believes that such an amount would be $200 for any individual transaction and $300 for a series of transactions within a month. In treating of the moral aspect of the "Black Market" on the part of the buyer, he asserts that, since in ordinary transactions there would be only a venial sin committed by the seller, the material co-operation on the part of the buyer would be excused by any good reason—for example, the inconvenience of disarranging a menu. However, if the seller's sin is serious, a grave inconvenience would be necessary to excuse the buyer from sin, because of the common good involved. Whoever causes a serious inconvenience to the community, or notably cripples the war effort by getting or providing goods outside the legal channels, sins mortally. However, he adds, this will usually apply only to "bootleggers" and to coupon counterfeiters who work on a large scale. The ordinary excesses and hoarding of common buyers, Father Jancauskis believes, are generally too insignificant and fail to concentrate enough on one article to hurt the common good, at least in the United States.

CO-OPERATION WITH NON-CATHOLICS

The problem of collaboration with non-Catholics, always a live issue, is arousing special interest among theologians because of the many new aspects of this problem occasioned by wartime conditions. The Rev. John McCarthy, D.D., writing in *The Irish Ecclesiastical Record* for December, 1943, discusses the question of the Protestant minister, the Jewish rabbi, and the Catholic priest, appearing together on the same stage to help bring about the "good neighbor" policy by delivering talks against prejudice. Admitting that he is speaking only in the light of general principles and of conditions with which he is familiar in his own land, Dr. McCarthy says: "We should look with grave

suspicions and disapproval upon this procedure. We are presuming that the discussions have a decidedly religious flavor and that the Catholic priest may not, or will not, according to the rules of the game, point out the falsity of the non-Catholic position. In such circumstances, given a general audience, it seems inevitable that there is considerable danger of indifferentism and perversion, a danger of equiparating truth and falsehood. But we Catholics cannot forget, and cannot be allowed to forget, that truth is one and that we have the truth; that ours is the one true Church founded by Christ, the Church which possesses exclusively the true Christian doctrine, the divine deposit committed by Christ to her care. We cannot tolerate doctrine other than our own, for such doctrine is false."

Writing in behalf of the "Sword of the Spirit" organization in England, the Rev. Andrew Beck, A.A., in the *Clergy Review* for July, 1943, admits that at the start of this movement there were certain acts of collaboration with non-Catholics which were open to wrong interpretations or were justly suspect. But, he says, those days are now past. England now contains goodly numbers of a new and vitally important type of Catholic, the well-educated man or woman of the professional class, partly the product of two or three generations of Catholic secondary schools and partly comprising that class of educated convert which for years past has been steadily coming into the Church. This keen, well-educated, active, apostolic laity of the professional classes, the schoolmaster, the lawyer, the journalist, the civil servant, is the type most fully represented in the "Sword of the Spirit." These persons, Dr. Beck believes, can be safely trusted to collaborate with non-Catholics without compromising Catholic principles. In reply to those who see in this movement a dangerous fostering of indifferentism he emphasizes that the immediate purpose of the "Sword," as regards non-Catholics, is to induce them to return to an understanding and practice of the natural law. "The question of Christian allegiance is not at issue. And in this sense, I think enthusiasts have too readily made the mistake of talking vaguely of the application of 'Christian principles' to national and international life, when, so far as cooperation is concerned, they have sought rather for the application of the principles of the natural law by people who, chiefly through the Christianity they profess, are themselves conscious of the natural law." Dr. Beck believes that through the "Sword of the Spirit" non-Catholics, instead of being strengthened in their errors (as some Catholics claim takes place) come to see how much more certain and secure than their own is the Catholic position.

In connection with Dr. Beck's article it is appropriate to quote a comment on the "Sword of the Spirit" movement, given by the reviewer of a recent biography of Cardinal Hinsley in the May–June issue of *The Month*. "The Sword of the Spirit, be it mentioned, was never envisaged as other than a Catholic movement, under Catholic inspiration and direction. It welcomed co-operation on the part of non-Catholics and accepted non-Catholics as associate but not full members."

Those who are inclined to agree with Dr. Beck, however, should bear in mind an important fact before advocating the application of his ideas to the United States. The fact is that there is a considerable group of English Catholics who, as Dr. Beck assures us, can be trusted to collaborate with non-Catholics toward the defence of the natural law without any danger that they will give expression to the tenets of indifferentism, or soften the Church's stand on the exclusive rights of Catholicism. As far as can be judged from the printed accounts of public statements made by the Catholics of England, including prominent members of the laity, they do not hesitate to tell their fellow-citizens of other denominations that the Catholic Church proclaims itself the only religion that is true and authorized by God.

Some striking instances of this courageous, uncompromising attitude of the English Catholic laity have appeared recently in connection with the proposed Educational Bill. To understand the opposition of Catholics to this measure, it must be remembered that according to the system now prevailing in England the government bears a large portion of the expense for the maintenance of Catholic schools. If this Bill becomes a law, Catholics themselves will be obliged to contribute much more than the present rate toward the upkeep of the Catholic school system. Some examples of the unhesitating manner in which Catholics express their opinion of this proposed legislation even in Parliament are given by the Rev. John Murray, S.J., in *The Month* for September-October, 1943. From Lord Russell of Killowen the House of Lords heard the following: "We want in our schools to teach the children the tremendous and solemn meaning of the Mass. We want to teach them the grace and the merits of the sacraments. We want to teach them the faith that is in them and the reasons for that faith; and it should all be bound up with the education as a whole and not be merely an isolated item in the curriculum. And above all, we want this done by teachers who believe what they teach." In the House of Commons Mr. David Logan made this statement: "We do not speak as 'Roman Catholics' with abbreviated titles or

inverted commas; we speak as members of a Church that was already well known in this country when education was being given to it. If you look around, you will find that many of the places that are now in the possession of others were ours in those days long ago. As the ancient owners of these places we have a right to come, not cap in hand, not begging, not as friars or Ishmaels, but as Englishmen claiming equal rights with other Englishmen. If we are good enough to fight for this country, we are good enough in a national system of education to share equally with every other man, woman or child in the benefits which the nation gives."

Not many American Catholics in public office would be so militantly Catholic in similar circumstances. And it is precisely because a considerable proportion of our prominent and educated lay Catholics are inclined to "soft-pedal" the unqualified exclusiveness of the Catholic religion that it is dangerous for them to participate in "intercredal" meetings, even when the purpose of these meetings is limited to the fostering of better understanding among citizens, the promotion of social welfare, or other like objectives of a purely natural character. Not a few of our Catholics would take occasion in such surroundings to state that every one has the God-given right to practice any religion he chooses, that the most ideal type of relation between church and state is realized when a government accords equal rights to all forms of religion, that we all have the duty of promoting the religious activities of the various churches, etc.—statements which are being incessantly repeated in our land today, but which no Catholic can approve if he wishes to be consistent with the principles of his faith.

MARRIAGE PROBLEMS

A case that will occur frequently in the next few years as a result of the sad havoc of war is that of the woman who received the announcement that her husband was missing in action, and subsequently heard nothing more about him. The question is: May this be regarded as sufficient proof of death to justify her in contracting another marriage? In the *Clergy Review* for November, 1943, Canon E. J. Mahoney discusses this problem. After citing the ecclesiastical decisions pertinent to the case, he points out that the Church demands greater proof of death than is usually required by civil law in order to permit the surviving spouse freedom to contract a new marriage. On the other hand, the Church does not demand absolute certainty. Nothing more than a very great probability, or moral certainty, is

required. A civil act, attesting death, is not the same as canonical proof; but it is corroborative proof and may be cited, at least as evidence of common report of death. Similarly, the fact that an insurance company has accepted its liability can be used an an indication arguing the fact of death. In practice, the decision must be left to the prudent judgment of the Ordinary who, if not satisfied, may refer the case to the Holy See. If he refuses the petition, the woman herself may petition the Holy See for a declaration of freedom to marry. Of course, the priest, to whom the case is ordinarily referred in the first place, is not empowered to give an authoritative decision. Canon Mahoney believes that in cases where the government presumes death, a petition may be properly addressed to the Ordinary, provided some additional indications are given, or provided the reasons on which the government has come to a decision are given in each case as fully as possible.

A practical case is discussed by the Rev. John Clifford, S.J., in *Theological Studies* for June, 1944, under the title "Marital Rights of the Sinfully Sterilized." The case concerns the married man who has culpably had himself sterilized by the operation of vasectomy, or the married woman who has procured a similar effect by some such operation as the ligation or the resection of the fallopian tubes. May such persons subsequently be permitted to have marital relations? In the event that the condition is irremediable, Father Clifford asserts that conjugal relations are lawful, although there is an obligation on the party (or parties) to repent of the sin. If the condition can be remedied, so that fertility can be restored, the repentant sinner must see to it that this is accomplished. However, in practice there is seldom an obligation to undergo an operation for the purpose of bringing about this effect, even in the case of simple ligation of the fallopian tubes. Father Clifford discusses the question as to whether or not a man who has had double vasectomy is impotent. He holds that, in practice, since there is probability that this condition causes only sterility, not impotence, the man should be allowed to marry and to exercise conjugal relations. He mentions, in passing, that the principles he upholds would apply likewise to the victims of Nazi-imposed sterilization or State sterilization.

CONFESSION BEFORE HOLY COMMUNION

One of the most widely discussed problems of moral theology concerns the interpretation of the law commanding that one who must

celebrate Mass or receive Holy Communion and is conscious of mortal sin shall go to confession if there is a *copia confessarii* (Can. 807, 856). Writing in *Theological Studies* for December, 1943, the Rev. H. R. Werts, S.J., discusses the case of a person in this situation, who would find the confession of a shameful sin very difficult because of unusual embarrassment in revealing it to the available confessor. Father Werts treats extensively the lawfulness of two possible courses—an act of perfect contrition and the reception of the sacrament of Penance without mention of the shameful sin.

All theologians would admit the general principle laid down by Father Werts, that there can be peculiar circumstances in which a person needing confession can, absolutely speaking, easily get to a confessor, but is not bound to do so. In such circumstances it can be said that morally there is lacking a *copia confessarii*. Such a case would certainly be realized if there were a grave danger that the particular confessor available would violate the sacramental seal, or if there were good reason to fear that the confession of the sin in question would lead the confessor himself into sin. In recent times some theologians have extended the principle to other cases. Berardi thought it would apply when otherwise an uncle would be obliged to confess a disgraceful sin to his nephew; Genicot adduced the case of a pastor with no other confessor available save a youthful curate. Other theologians qualified this latter opinion by emphasizing that the mere relation of pastor and curate must not be regarded as sufficient—there must be added the circumstance of extraordinary embarrassment. It must not be thought, however, that this view was unanimously accepted by theologians, even with the aforesaid qualification. Merkelbach strongly condemns this interpretation of the law of confession even in the case when a father would have to confess a shameful sin to his son, on the grounds that it is something new in the history of theology, which would open the door to many abuses (*Summa Theologiae Moralis*, III, n. 272).

Father Werts proposes a very lenient view as to the obligation of confessing a sin to a particular confessor in the event that this would entail extraordinary embarrassment. "Repugnance and embarrassment which ordinarily accompany confession of a shameful sin are intrinsic both to integral confession and to the law requiring confession of mortal sin before reception of the Holy Eucharist. But extraordinary embarrassment arising from circumstances not ordinarily connected with confession is properly called extrinsic to these obliga-

tions. . . . It is reasonable to admit that the obligation [of confessing before Holy Communion] would cease in this difficulty, supposing, of course, that there is perfect contrition and an urgent need for celebrating the Holy Sacrifice or receiving Communion, as this necessity is understood in canons 807 and 856." Subsequently, proposing cases in which extraordinary embarrassment may be present, he says: "It is an extraordinary state of affairs when a priest cannot reach any but his curate without a long journey. So also, it is an extraordinary condition when one can confess only to his brother, son, uncle or very close friend."

The other possible course for one who should go to confession as a preparation for the Holy Eucharist but has a sufficient reason for not manifesting a certain sin to the confessor or confessors available, is to make a confession that is formally but not materially integral. In other words, the sinner could go to confession, tell some sins, but not the particular sin in question, and then be absolved from this sin indirectly, while receiving direct absolution from the others. Father Werts admits that fewer authors allow this course than permit the former; nevertheless, he believes that this second method of procedure can be justified by the same reasons as can the first, among which he includes the embarrassment previously described. "The difficulty that permits the entire omission of a required confession should also be sufficient to permit the omission of a part of the confession, provided that this difficulty is not intrinsic to the law which determines the essentials of confession. Extraordinary and morally insuperable embarrassment seems to be such a difficulty." Father Werts proposes the question: In the event that either course is possible, which would be the better procedure when one must celebrate Mass or receive Holy Communion—to confess without mentioning the shameful sin or to omit the confession and make an act of perfect contrition? He replies that either course could be followed, and that the choice could be made dependently on subjective considerations.

While it must be granted that there are circumstances in which one who has sinned gravely may celebrate Mass or receive Holy Communion after eliciting an act of perfect contrition, and also that there are occasions in which one may go to confession and yet omit explicit mention of certain sins, the application of these principles by Father Werts seems too broad. He himself admits that there is danger of abuse if these opinions are spread abroad, and says that they must not be taught indiscriminately to penitents who are unable to make the

proper distinctions and who might easily exaggerate the difficulty arising from their embarrassment in the confessional. He believes, however, that there will be little danger of abuse if the limits set by authors are observed, and adds that the danger is mitigated by the fact that the obligation to confess the shameful sin remains.

However, the consequences which would seem to follow logically from the opinion proposed by Father Werts are so extreme that it is difficult to regard the view as tenable. This is especially true in reference to his opinion that the embarrassment involved in confessing a shameful sin to a very close friend excuses from the obligation of confessing. Father Werts, it is true, restricts the case to circumstances in which only one confessor, or at most two, can be approached. It is not evident why this restriction is made. If extreme embarrassment excuses a person from confessing a certain sin to an intimate friend, there seems to be no reason why he should be obliged to confess it, even if twenty priests are available, provided they are all close friends, as could well be the case in a religious community. Would it not follow from this that a priest working in a distant mission field, with only a group of his religious brethren available as confessors, could keep back grave sins for years, while going regularly to confession? Furthermore, it would seem to follow from this same view that even in the hour of death a person could omit the mention of shameful sins in confession, if the only confessors available were his close friends. In view of such conclusions, it would seem that the opinion allowing embarrassment to excuse one from confessing a shameful sin to a close friend cannot safely be followed.

MISCELLANEA

A question of practical interest, the participation of a Catholic undertaker in the cremation of a corpse, is discussed in the *Australasian Catholic Record* for October, 1943. Special attention is given to the case of the undertaker who expressly advertises: "Cremations arranged." The Rev. John J. Nevin, who discusses the case, adopts a lenient view. "We understand that in all our large cities undertakers generally, Catholics included, arrange cremations. This means that they notify the officials at the crematorium that they will have a body there for cremation at such an hour on such a date. They never take part in the actual cremation themselves. . . In all this we cannot see any more than material co-operation. Of course, if a particular undertaker were to go out of his way and tried to pro-

mote or foster the practice of cremation among Catholics, or in a particular case were to induce the relatives of a deceased person to have the body cremated rather than buried, then his co-operation would be formal." Dr. Nevin then concludes that the material co-operation of which he speaks can be justified for a grave reason, and adduces in corroboration a decree of the Holy Office, given on July 27, 1892. He believes that the additional clause "cremations arranged" would not substantially alter the moral aspect of the case, unless this expression is something new and offensive to Catholics or can be regarded by them as an invitation to have the bodies of their relatives cremated, or in any other way shows disrespect for the Church's stand on the matter.

In *The Morality of Imperfections* (Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C., 1944), the Rev. James C. Osbourn, O.P., upholds the view that to choose the less perfect of two courses of action, either of which is reasonably possible, is an imprudent act, a deliberate retardation of charity, and therefore in itself a venial sin. Father Osbourn presents his view quite ably, though he differs from what seems to be the more common view at the present time, that an imperfection of this kind is not in itself a sin (cf. Merkelbach, *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, I, n. 415).

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THE NEW ENCYCLICAL ON BIBLICAL STUDIES
PART THREE: TASKS OF THE MODERN INTERPRETER

THE PRESENT STATE OF EXEGESIS

It will be exceedingly difficult to find a work of literature which has engaged the attention of so many gifted intellects and has been subjected to such minute analysis for so many centuries as the Bible. Hence, the average interpreter is apt to imagine that original scriptural research is all but impossible and that his task consists merely in summarizing and sifting the results of past investigation. To counteract the paralyzing effect of this erroneous mental attitude, the Encyclical states emphatically: "And, furthermore, we may rightly and deservedly hope that our times, also, can contribute something towards a more profound and more accurate interpretation of Sacred Scripture."[1]

To show that the utimate has not been achieved, the Encyclical points out that commentators of the past lacked the requisite information to explain certain topics, especially those relating to ancient history, so that their solutions of these problems are either altogether ineffectual or only partially satisfying. The oft-repeated efforts of the Fathers to elucidate the first chapters of Genesis and the re-iterated attempts of Saint Jerome to produce an adequate version of the Psalms are cited to illustrate the difficulties encountered by the Fathers.

The futility of believing that we cannot advance beyond the exegesis of Christian antiquity is shown further by the fact that our modern age has uncovered hitherto unsuspected difficulties in other books or texts. "Quite erroneously, therefore, do some who lack insight into the state of biblical science assert that nothing remains for a Catholic exegete to add to what Christian antiquity has produced; for our times have, on the contrary, brought to light so many things requiring new investigation and new examination and spurring the zeal of the present-day interpreter to activity in no small degree."[2]

THE CHARACTER AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE AUTHOR

The Holy Father then proposes an effective means to secure a more profound understanding of the sacred text. This is based on the

[1] *AAS*, XXXV, Oct. 20, 1944 (NCWC, Feb. 20, 1944), p. 313.
[2] *Ibid.*

more precise and more perfect definition of biblical inspiration evolved by theologians from the doctrine of Saint Thomas.

Proceeding to explain the principle that the inspired writer, while composing a sacred book, is the "organ" or instrument of the Holy Spirit, an instrument endowed with life and reason, they observe rightly that he so uses his faculties and powers, under the influence of divine action, that all may easily infer from the book due to his efforts "the character of each particular author and, so to speak, his individual qualities and lineaments." The interpreter, therefore, should strive, with all possible care and without neglecting any of the light furnished by more recent research, to ascertain the character and circumstances of the sacred writer, the age in which he flourished, the sources, written or oral, which he used, and the forms of expression which he employed. Thus, he will be able to learn more effectually who the sacred author was and what he intended to express when writing. For no one is ignorant of the fact that the supreme rule of interpretation consists in perceiving and defining what an author intended to say, as Saint Athanasius excellently remarks: "In accordance with the proper way of dealing with all other passages of Sacred Scripture, we should observe here the occasion on which the Apostle spoke; we should note accurately and faithfully the person to whom he wrote, the motive which impelled him to write, lest we miss the true meaning by being ignorant of these points or by misapprehending them."[3]

Developing these directions of the Encyclical in somewhat greater detail, we may say, with all students of literature, that the following factors affect the pattern of thought and the style of an author: his intellectual and artistic endowments, temperament, education, economic condition, station in life, the country and period in which he lived, the race to which he belonged and the vicissitudes of fortune which he suffered.

A few examples will show how these elements may influence the concepts and mode of expression employed by an author. The difference in literary excellence discernible in the Books of the Prophets must in large measure at least be attributed to the greater or lesser native ability of the authors. The extremely sensitive disposition of Jeremias accounts for the personal agony, despondency, and distress which he manifests in his book (15:10–18; 20:14–18). Both Saint Paul and Saint John were enthusiastic followers of Christ, but in emotional intensity the Beloved Disciple seems to have been surpassed by the Apostle to the Gentiles, as is evidenced by Saint Paul's eulogy of

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 314.

charity (I Cor. 13:1–13), which is without parallel in the more calm and more meditative writings of Saint John. Saint Paul's rabbinic education exerted some effect upon the manner in which he cites Sacred Scripture. The discriminating way in which Saint Luke uses medical terms accords with his profession (Col. 4:14). Amos was a shepherd in the wilderness of Tekoa; his imagery reflects his avocation and experiences (3:4, 8, 12; 5:19; 7:1 ff). The knowledge which Ezechiel has of the Temple and its ritual and the zeal which he manifests for holiness in the divine service spring fundamentally from the consciousness of his sacerdotal dignity (1:1–3). The fact that Ecclesiastes lived in the post-exilic period is revealed by his vocabulary, syntax, and Aramaicisms. Unless we are acquainted with the salient features of Saint Paul's life, we cannot fully understand his declaration that he lost everything and accounted it rubbish to gain Christ (Phil. 3:8).

In addition, the interpretation of a book will be considerably facilitated if we know the purpose for which it was written, the readers for whom it was destined, and the occasion on which it was written. An intelligent author will adapt his material and style to the purpose which he has in view and the audience which he wishes to instruct and impress. The occasion prompting him to write will cause him to allude to persons and events connected with that occasion and will influence the treatment of his subject. Thus the Epistle to Philemon was occasioned by the fact that Saint Paul, during his imprisonment, converted Onesimus, a slave who had robbed his master, Philemon, at Colossae and then fled to Rome. We cannot appreciate the delicate tact, courtesy, goodness of heart, and beauty of doctrine manifested in this Epistle, unless we consider the situation of Saint Paul, the status of fugitive slaves in the Roman empire, the exalted dignity which Onesimus acquired in the eyes of Saint Paul by reason of his conversion, the friendly relations subsisting between Saint Paul and Philemon, the bitterness which Philemon must have felt against Onesimus, the thoroughness with which Philemon had imbibed the principles of Christianity, and the lofty purpose which dictated the composition of the letter.

Moreover, the authors of the Bible were for the most part Semites and natives of Palestine. They display the emotional characteristics of their race and its fondness for vivid imagery, parable, allegory, and pithy sayings. The climate, fauna, flora, and physical features of their country became inevitably a part of their literary compositions. The same holds true of the topography of districts and cities. Con-

sequently, without a reasonable familiarity with these matters, we shall miss the allusive force of many scriptural passages.

Furthermore, we cannot ignore the historical background of the period in which the writer lived: the domestic policy of Israel's rulers as well as their relations with the neighboring nations. As a matter of fact, these nations played so vital a part in the fortunes of Israel that some acquaintance with their history is unavoidable. Who, for instance, can estimate properly the literary qualities of the Prophecy of Nahum, without knowing the power and pride of ancient Nineveh? We must remember, also, that the history of the chosen people is an organic whole, frequently necessitating a study of antecedent developments before any particular phase can be clearly understood.

Finally, every book of the Bible mirrors, more or less, the economic, social, cultural, and religious institutions of its age. It is obvious, therefore, that we cannot neglect any source which may throw light on these institutions.

THE STUDY OF THE ANCIENT LITERARY STYLE

One of the most impressive and novel features of the Encyclical is its insistence that we use all the resources of history, archeology, ethnology, and other sciences to discover and understand the literary forms which writers of the biblical age would be likely to use and did in fact employ.

> For to express their ideas, men of the ancient East did not always use the same forms and the same modes of expression which we use today, but rather those which were accepted among the peoples of their age and their region. What these were the exegete cannot determine *a priori*, as it were, but only by an accurate examination of the ancient literature of the East. Now, within the past decades, this investigation has been conducted with greater care and diligence than before; hence it has shown us more clearly what forms of expression were used in those ancient times either in poetic descriptions or in proposing rules of life and laws or, finally, in narrating the facts and events of history.[4]

This method of determining the meaning of biblical terms and phrases still needs further and more thorough exploitation. A brief consideration of some of the more interesting results obtained thus far will show the usefulness and timeliness of the Encyclical's observations on this point.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 315.

Now that the Babylonian, Assyrian, and Hittite codes of law have been deciphered, it is evident that not all the laws of the Pentateuch are due to divine revelation. The fact that certain laws are ascribed to God must be interpreted as signifying that Moses obtained divine approval for laws which he adopted or modified from pre-existing legislation in the Near East.

It has been found that the Egyptian Wisdom of Amen-em-ope so closely resembles a section in Proverbs (22:17; 24:22) that some form of literary relationship must be presumed. What this is does not concern us here. We merely wish to note the fact that the book of the Egyptian sage may be used to clarify some obscure points in the section of Proverbs to which it is related.[5]

The Ras Shamrah tablets, also, have thrown light on some obscure biblical expressions. From the *Dn'l* poem we learn that the root *r h p*, which is used to describe the action of the Spirit of God in Gen. 1:2, does not mean "to brood" but "to soar" or "fly over a place." The Vulgate rendering, *movebatur*, is thus proven to be more correct.[6] In Ps. 68:5, God is pictured as *rokeb bac-araboth*. This phrase was thought to signify, "He who rides through deserts," but the Ugaritic[7] literature now indicates that it means, "He who rides on the clouds."[8] When Isaias depicts the oppressors of Israel collectively as "Leviathan, the fleeing serpent and Leviathan, the tortuous serpent" he is using figurative language derived from Canaanite mythology. The same words are found in the Ras Shamrah poem, "The Death of Baal," where they denote a monster of chaos: "as thou didst smite Lotan, the fleeing serpent; as thou didst consume the tortuous serpent, the mighty one of seven heads."[9] A reference to the heads of Leviathan is contained in Ps. 74:14. That the word Leviathan is equivalent to Lotan can be demonstrated with ease.

The papyri afford us some striking illustrations of the language of the New Testament. The verb ἀπέχειν which occurs in the Gospel of St. Matthew (6:2, 5, 16), and in Saint Paul (Phil. 4:18) signifies "to receive in full" in the papyri.[10] This rendering gives a deeper

[5] Cf. A. Mallon, S.J., "La Sagesse de L'Egytien Amen-em-Ope," *Biblica*, 1927; Erman, *OLZ* (May, 1924); Gressmann, *ZAW*, pp. 278 ff.

[6] Cf. Millar Burrows, *What Mean These Stones?* (New Haven: American Schools of Oriental Research, 1941), p. 45.

[7] *Ugarit* is the name of the ancient city situated at Ras Shamrah.

[8] Cf. Burrows, *op.cit.*, p. 42.

[9] Cf. *Syria*, XV, 305 ff.

[10] Cf. C. M. Cobern, *The New Archeological Discoveries* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1920), p. 34.

meaning to the scriptural passages concerned. Saint Paul aptly characterizes the Law as our παιδαγωγός, leading us to Christ (Gal. 3:24), for this was an inferior instructor, frequently a slave who guided and protected children on their way to school. Gentile Christians who were familiar with the motion of "The table of the Lord Serapis," found in an Egyptian papyrus, must have understood the ascription of divinity implied in Saint Paul's expression, "The table of the Lord" (I Cor. 7:22).[11] Saint Paul represents the Christian as Christ's freedman (I Cor. 7:22), bought with a price (I Cor. 6:20; 7:23) and redeemed from the curse of the Law (Gal. 4:5). These expressions must have made a vivid impression upon Greeks familiar with the procedure observed in the liberation of slaves at Delphi, where the slave's master took the redemption price, as it were, from the hand of the god, and thus the slave became the freedman of the god.[12] Many other examples could be given illustrating the manner in which the papyri and inscriptions help us to understand the language of the New Testament, but on account of the limitations of space, these must suffice.

THE HISTORICAL BOOKS AND LITERARY STYLE

When discussing the necessity of studying the literary style of the ancients, the Encyclical singles out the historical books for special mention. It reiterates the verdict of all modern scholars that the historical literature of the Hebrews surpasses that of other neighboring nations in antiquity as well as in fidelity. This superiority is attributed to the charism of inspiration and to the religious purpose which guided the composition of Israel's historical books.

The Encyclical, however, admonishes us that inspiration is not incompatible with certain peculiarities of style, such as approximations, hyperbole, and paradox. It states expressly that none of the modes of expression in vogue among ancient peoples, especially those of the Orient, is excluded from the Scriptures, provided that it is not in conflict with the holiness and truth of God. "For," the Encyclical continues, "just as the substantial Word of God became like to man in all things 'except sin,' so the words of God expressed in human language have been made like human speech in all respects except error; in this consists the 'condescension' of the God of Providence, already eulogized in the highest terms by Saint John Chrysostom and repeatedly affirmed by him to be found in the Sacred Books."[13]

[11] Cf. Burrows, *op. cit.*, p. 269.
[12] Cf. *ibid.*
[13] *AAS*, ibid., p. 316.

The Encyclical, therefore, assures the Catholic commentator that he cannot satisfy the modern requirements of biblical science, without investigating the modes of expression adopted by the sacred writer. It urges exegetes to make a prudent use of the results of this investigation in explaining and defending the Scriptures. They are warned that they cannot neglect this part of their office without serious detriment to Catholic exegesis. In support of this assertion, the Encyclical points out that many of the accusations of error brought against the Bible are based on a misunderstanding of certain terms and expressions used by the ancients. Moreover, the Encyclical declares that a knowledge of the literary style employed by the ancients is useful not only for refuting error, but also for understanding the mind of the sacred author more fully. Accordingly, those who cultivate biblical studies are exhorted not to pass over any discovery of archeology, ancient history, or literature which may enable us to grasp the mentality of the writers of ancient times as well as the manner and artistic form in which they presented their arguments, their narratives, and their writings.

AN INVITATION TO THE LAITY

These directions of the Encyclical demand a profound acquaintance with the sciences relating to antiquity. This requires so much time and labor that only specialists can hope to attain this proficiency. A priest who devotes himself to them is somewhat handicapped because he must spend so many years in acquiring the sciences directly concerned with his ministry. Hence, the Encyclical invites Catholic laymen to specialize in these studies. Catholic laymen, thoroughly imbued with the principles of their religion and adequately equipped from a scientific point of view could occupy the professorial chairs in our universities and direct scientific expeditions. By their intellectual leadership in these branches of knowledge they could do much to stem and dissipate the wild speculations which are advanced at times to discredit the historical truth of the Bible.

The Encyclical offers lofty inducements to secure the co-operation of competent laymen. It tells them that every branch of science has an innate dignity and excellence, because it is a finite participation in the infinite knowledge of God and that this dignity assumes the form of a consecration if the science in question is employed to throw a brighter light upon the things of God.

THE UNSOLVED DIFFICULTIES OF THE BIBLE

After noting that many of the difficulties formerly brought against the Bible have now been solved and that confidence in the Scriptures has been restored, the Holy Father discusses the fact that certain biblical problems have hitherto not found a satisfactory solution. He bids us not to be discouraged, telling us that a solution can only be reached gradually, just as in nature plants produce fruit only after a slow growth and much labor. If the answer tarries, we are not to become impatient but to remember the admonition given by the Fathers, especially by Saint Augustine: "God deliberately scattered difficulties over the Sacred Books which He inspired, in order that we may be incited to read and scrutinize them more intently and that we may be exercised in due submission of soul by experiencing in a salutary way the limitations of our intellect."[14] We are not to be surprised if some problems will never be solved. They may be too obscure and too remote from our age and experience; then, too, exegesis, like every other important science, may have its secrets impervious to our minds and defying every effort to unlock them.

THE LIBERTY OF THE CATHOLIC COMMENTATOR

The Catholic commentator, however, is not to be deterred by these considerations from attacking hitherto unsolved problems again and again, with the purpose not only of refuting adversaries but also of finding a satisfactory solution, in harmony with the exegetical principles of the Church and the well-established conclusions of profane science. The strenuous efforts of Catholic exegetes to find a solution are to be appraised with justice and charity; a solution is not to be condemned merely because it is new. Critics should bear in mind that the standards and rules laid down by the Church for the interpretation of Sacred Scripture are concerned with matters of faith and morals only. They should remember that the Church has defined but a few of the many texts contained in the Sacred Books and that the number of texts concerning which the Fathers are in unanimous agreement is not greater.

Many, therefore, and indeed, most important questions, remain in the discussion and exposition of which the acumen and ingenuity of Catholic interpreters may and should be freely exercised, in order that each one may

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 318.

make his own special contribution for the advantage of all, for the ever greater progress of sacred doctrine, for both the defense and the honor of the Church. This is the true liberty of the children of God, which faithfully maintains the teaching of the Church, whilst at the same time it accepts and uses with a grateful heart, as a divine gift, anything brought to light by profane science. This liberty, when upheld and sustained by the good will of all, is the condition and the source of all genuine fruit and all solid progress . . . .[15]

PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The last part of the Encyclical is devoted to some practical recommendations of the greatest moment. Priests are exhorted to make Sacred Scripture their own by prayer and meditation and to diffuse, in every possible way, the knowledge which they have acquired. Avoiding arbitrary and far-fetched accommodations, they are to explain the Bible "so eloquently, so lucidly, so clearly, that the faithful may be moved and inflamed not only to reform their lives but may conceive in their hearts the highest veneration for Sacred Scripture."[16]

Bishops are urged to promote all worthy enterprises conducive to a knowledge of Sacred Scripture: pious associations for the diffusion of the Bible, the daily reading of the Scriptures in the family circle, vernacular translations, and lectures on biblical topics. All ministers of the sanctuary are told to support and spread periodicals devoted to the scientific or popular presentation of Holy Writ. Seminarians are to be instructed primarily in the literal sense and in the theological content of the Scriptures, in such a way that their hearts may burn with spiritual ardor.

The Encyclical stresses the fact that the Bible has a special value for the faithful in the present world catastrophe. Humanity can be saved only by turning to Christ:

> But men will know Christ, this author of our salvation, more fully and love Him more ardently and imitate Him more faithfully, the more earnestly they are induced to know and meditate upon Holy Writ, especially the New Testament, for, as Saint Jerome, the Doctor of Stridon says, "Not to know the Scriptures is not to know Christ," and again, "If there is anything in this life which sustains a wise man and persuades him to be of serene mind amid the calamities and upheavals of the world, this, I think, is primarily the meditation and knowledge of the Scripture."[16]

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 319.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 320.

CONCLUSION

In concluding the Encyclical, the Holy Father addresses some moving words of encouragement to biblical scholars. They are reminded of the sublimity of their office and of the great spiritual advantages which they derive from it. To convey these advantages to others, they should pray that they may understand, labor intensely to grasp the meaning of the Bible, teach, and preach.

They are to emulate the example of the great commentators of bygone days "that the Church may now also, as in the past, have eminent doctors to expound Holy Writ and that by their laborious efforts the faithful may perceive all the enlightenment, encouragement, and joy contained in Sacred Scripture."[17] Amid this arduous toil, they should find solace in the Sacred Books and in the thought of the special reward which awaits those who teach others the way to justice.

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 324.

WHITEHEAD'S STRANGE NEW "DEITY"
A CLOSE-UP OF AN UNUSUAL BEING

PART TWO

Professor Alfred North Whitehead conceives of the deity as a Principle of Concretion having a Primordial Nature and a Consequent Nature. Let us see now how the Consequent Nature functions according to Whitehead. It is somewhat complicated. But apparently it functions in two ways. First, God operates on events in terms of his own nature, which is concerned with the production of value. He "saves" the best parts of the world by storing them up in an eternally living and cumulative record. All past values are present in full immediacy in God's experience. But how can the past survive in full immediacy? Whitehead's only suggestion is that it occurs in somewhat the same way in which a person's past not merely lingers in the memory, but is summed up in the present person.[1]

Secondly, God's Consequent Nature integrates the achieved evils of the world with their ideal complements into a system in which the evil character fades away as far as God is concerned. When a wrong note is sounded in the human scene, God sounds a note which counterbalances it and thus achieves the aesthetic experience of weaving discordant elements into a harmony whose value has been heightened by the intensity of contrasting opposites.

This is, however, of doubtful religious significance or value. It affords scant comfort to men and women upon whose homes falling bombs are screeching out their portents of destruction and death to be told that ideal counterparts of these discordant notes are being sounded on a celestial key-board; bringing joy and rapture to the player. To suffering and agonizing mortals here below, such a manipulation of their own frightful disharmonies into symphonies of aesthetic joy, none of which flows back to them, appears as a form of callous indifference and smug selfishness. Instead of attracting them, such a manipulation of *their* sweat and tears and blood can only repel them. It will strike them as offensive as the action of a munitions manufacturer who would coin the flesh and blood of their sons into millions of profit for himself. In other words the series of events occurring

[1] Cf. *Process and Reality*. pp. 531 f.

in God's nature, each with its ideal complement neutralizing *for him* my suffering, has no parallel in my life and therefore no significance or value for me.

OASES BECOME MIRAGES

The influence of God's Consequent Nature on the world is called the Superjective Nature of God. As to the precise mode of its functioning, however, Whitehead leaves us completely in the dark. In one brief passage about it, he startles us by throwing in such phrases as "particular providence" and "love in heaven." These apparent Oases in a Sahara of unconscious, impersonal pulling of switches indiscriminately to the right or left, with no apparent concern for their effect upon the welfare and happiness of humanity, turn out upon closer scrutiny to be disappointing mirages. After using these phrases, Whitehead promptly runs away and gives us no inkling as to what they mean.

Nor in his later book, *Adventures of Ideas*, does he even once recur to them. Indeed, in this book God is scarcely mentioned by name. The "Primordial Nature of God," has now metamorphosed into the "Eros of the Universe." In the last page or two, the "Consequent Nature of God" seems to have become "the Unity of Adventure." But a microscopic search reveals no trace of the "*Superjective Nature of God*" which loomed up so suddenly as a tropical island in a bleak metaphysical sea, only to disappear with equal suddenness.

Is Whitehead's deity an omnipotent creator? Far from it. He repudiates such a concept with horror. Belief in such a God is, according to him, "the fallacy which has infused tragedy into the histories of Christianity and Mahometanism."[2] He is equally severe in denouncing such a concept in *Science and the Modern World*, in *Religion in the Making*, and in *Adventures of Ideas*. He curiously attributes to Plato the discovery "that the divine element in the world is to be conceived as a persuasive agency and not as a coercive agency." This he characterizes as "one of the greatest intellectual discoveries in the history of religion."[3]

"IS WHITEHEAD'S DEITY GOOD?"

Is Whitehead's deity good? Of this we can't be sure. But it would seem that he is not. This, in spite of the function of his Consequent

[2] *Process and Reality*, p. 519.
[3] *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 213.

Nature in proposing ideals to event-atoms at the moment of their birth—ideals which they appear in the majority of cases blissfully to ignore. Far from assisting mortals in their struggle against suffering and evil in all its forms here below, he seems to exult in the manipulation of such agony for his own peculiar aesthetic joy. The greater the suffering of humans, the greater is the intensification of his own rapture, which results from the opposition of contrasts. This to most men will appear as a form of sadism peculiarly revolting.

Such too is substantially the conclusion reached by Prof. S. L. Ely. Pointing out that Whitehead's God makes no contribution to the solution of the problem of evil, Ely continues:

> . . . neither is he good in any sense satisfactory to the temporary actualities of the world. But we cannot even be sure that he does not will evil—not as such, to be sure, but incidentally. What is evil to us may appear, by virtue of contrast and synthesis, beautiful to God. Perhaps World Wars are the black spots necessary for the perfection of the divine painting. If they are, God may have lured us to courses of action that to us are unmitigatedly bad. If this has occurred, perhaps it would be just to refer it to another metaphysical aspect of God—his Diabolic Nature.[4]

This is strong language, but, in the writer's judgment, not too strong. It seems to be well within the margin of the evidence. Starting out apparently to give us a deity, Whitehead ends his sculpturing with a product that seems to have considerable resemblance to a satyr if not to a daemon.

Is Whitehead's deity "positively righteous?" "No," answers Charles Hartshorne, "if this means, Does he reward and punish with mathematical exactitude. . . . It is not possible that God should serve any absolute law of reward and punishment and also get on with the business of cosmic prosperity and beauty."[5] With the world going to rack and ruin at unprecedented speed, it does not appear that Whitehead's deity has gotten on very well with the business of cosmic prosperity.

BEAUTY ABOVE TRUTH?

Whitehead exalts aesthetic experience to a strange and dizzy height. Some light would seem to be thrown on the influence, prompting him

[4] *The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God,* p. 51. This is a clear and penetrating study.

[5] *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead,* Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University, 1941), p. 553.

to exalt beauty to such preeminence among all the values, by a sentence in his autobiography. Speaking of his wife, he says: "Her vivid life taught me that beauty, moral and aesthetic, is the aim of existence."[6] This then is a conviction achieved not by metaphysical analysis, but of what he has elsewhere referred to as "the illicit introduction of other considerations." According to Whitehead, actual facts are those of aesthetic feeling. With him, feeling is not merely feeling in general, but feeling for beauty. Thus aesthetic experience takes on such a cosmic significance that Beauty dwarfs the remaining two of the famous trio, Truth and Goodness, into insignificance. Their only value is what they contribute to Beauty.

Says Whitehead: "Beauty is a wider, and more fundamental, notion than Truth. . . . Apart from Beauty, Truth is neither good, nor bad. . . . The real world is good when it is beautiful. . . . The teleology of the Universe is directed to the production of Beauty. . . . Thus Beauty is left as the one aim which by its nature is self-justifying."[7]

This emphasis upon beauty fits in with Whitehead's contention that all values are fundamentally aesthetic. It is congruous likewise with his portrayal of what seems to be the chief absorption of his deity, the manipulation of the discordant undertones of the sufferings of humans into a harmonium whose overtones are those of aesthetic rapture for him. We are offered a deity, preoccupied with beauty, but indifferent apparently to truth and goodness. Whitehead quotes Plato on several occasions with approbation and seems to hold him in reverence. We can only wonder if he has forgotten what that deeply religious thinker said near the close of his life: "When a man honours beauty above goodness, this is nothing else than a literal and a total dishonouring of the soul."[8]

"A DESICCATED METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE"

What about the propriety of Whitehead's use of the term, God? He has been roundly criticized for using that venerable name in a thoroughly unwarranted manner. Certainly few will find in the product of his metaphysical speculations much resemblance to the God of Christianity or of historical theism. It emerges as a dessicated metaphysical principle from which all the juice of spiritual vitality and religious significance has been sucked.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[7] *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 341; 344, 345, 342.
[8] Plato, *Laws*, 727 D., tr. Bury.

Writing in *Mind*, Stebbing waxes indignant, declaring: "Professor Whitehead's indefensible usage of language becomes little short of scandalous when he speaks of 'God' . . . It is difficult to acquit Professor Whitehead of a deliberate desire to encourage the unclear thinking that is so common with regard to this subject."[9]

Did Whitehead begin to realize the impropriety of such usage? It is difficult to say with certainty. But it is noteworthy that in the last book of his trilogy, consisting of *Science and the Modern World*, *Process and Reality*, and *Adventures of Ideas*, he almost abandons the use of the term God. In *Process and Reality*, he tells us that he calls his cosmic being God "because the contemplation of our natures, as enjoying real feelings derived from the timeless source of all order, acquires that 'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship at which religions aim."[10] But if the "timeless source of all order" is neither omnipotent nor benevolent but chiefly preoccupied in twisting the pains of humans into heightened raptures for hmself, it is not clear that humanity would feel much refreshment from his presence or experience much craving for his companionship.

It is worth noting that the religious functions which Whitehead attributes to God (in his Consequent Nature) are not reached by rigorous metaphysical analysis but are arrived at by religious intuitions. Thus Whitehead concedes that "there is nothing . . . in the nature of proof. . . . Any cogency of argument entirely depends upon elucidation of somewhat exceptional elements in our conscious experience—those elements which may roughly be classed together as religious and moral intuitions."[11]

"A CURIOUS PREDICAMENT"

This leaves the person relying upon philosophical reasoning in a curious predicament. The only deity which Whitehead could produce through metaphysical analysis has no religious value. On the other hand, the only deity which has any religious value was produced by means of moral intuitions and hence has no metaphysical value. In other words, when Whitehead speaks of a God which might possibly have some slight meaning for struggling humanity here below, he doffs his mantle as a metaphysician, and speaks merely as a man with religious feelings and intuitions. But are his religious intuitions any

[9] *Mind*, XXXIX (1930), 475.
[10] *Process and Reality*, p. 47.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 521.

more reliable than those of Billy Sunday or Gypsy Smith? We are given no evidence that they are.

It is difficult then to see on what rational grounds ministers, educators, editors of religious journals and other religious minded people should acclaim, with great waving of banners and shouts of jubilation, Whitehead's occasional mention of God. The enthusiasm is obviously a case of failure to understand what he means by God. Scarcely a ripple in the stream of practical religious life has resulted from the dropping of his few metaphysical pebbles. Even now, while he is still alive, there is the widest divergence and the greatest confusion as to what he really means by God.

The inquisitive individual who submitted his income returns to five different tax specialists and got five different answers could easily duplicate his experience if he submitted the question as to what Whitehead means by God to five professional metaphysicians. Let them con their Whiteheads till the cows come home, you will find them still groping in the fog to catch his meaning—if there is a meaning.

Bertrand Russell was his colleague when the two of them brought out conjointly their *Principia Mathematica*. On the basis of that familiarity he might be expected to have an initial advantage in understanding his colleague when the latter turned his hand to metaphysics. But does he? Listen to him after he read the eleventh chapter of *Science and the Modern World*, wherein Whitehead proclaims God as a necessary metaphysical principle. "I must confess with regret," writes Russell, "that I have failed to understand Professor Whitehead's argument on this important subject. And, speaking generally, I cannot persuade myself that his logical reconstruction of physical concepts has any such tendency as he attributes to it to restore the consolations of religion to a world desolated by mechanism."[12]

Metaphysics is no easy branch of philosophy. It calls for profound thinking and the ability to marshall abstract concepts as the mathematician handles algebraic symbols. But the mathematician solves no problem unless he handles his symbols with accuracy and makes his formulae unmistakably clear. It is difficult to see how a metaphysician can solve any problem knitting the philosophical brow unless he handles abstract concepts correctly and makes his meaning clear. Certainly in this latter function Whitehead fails badly. The variety of conflicting interpretations, reached not only by metaphysicians in general but also by his own disciples and exponents, raise the ques-

[12] *Nation and Athenaeum*, XXXIX (1926), 206 f.

tion whether any one understands him. It plagues us with the further disturbing question as to whether or not there is any real meaning or coherence in large stretches of Whitehead's metaphysical writings. We do not believe there is. *Verba et praeterea nihil* is our considered judgment on many lengthy passages.

MURKINESS NEVER GENERATES LIGHT

"The success of language in conveying information," Whitehead has himself remarked, "is vastly overrated, especially in learned circles." We must admit that his own obscurity of language clouds much of his thought and thus prevents it from reaching his readers. We fail to understand, however, why language, if properly chosen, cannot successfully convey information. The English language is a remarkably rich and flexible instrument to vehicle thought, even profound thought. William James never failed to make his meaning crystal clear. Moreover he did it with a grace and a brilliance which make his works a joy to read—even where one disagrees with his thought.

Orestes A. Brownson has done some of the most profound philosophical thinking that has been done in America, yet he succeeded in expressing his thought with unmistakable clarity. Cardinal Newman penetrated deeply into the grounds of belief in his *Grammar of Assent.* But in that work as in all of his numerous books, the great scholar of Oxford makes his thought transparent through his words. In the case of Whitehead, we think the fault lies not with the English tongue, but with the blurred and foggy character of the thought itself. *In that inner murkiness lies the reason for the opacity characterizing so much of his writing.*

Whether or not we are right in our diagnosis as to the cause of the non-transparency of much of his language, there is no dispute among scholars as to the fact. From whichever cause it stems, the practical result, virtual unintelligibility, is the same. But only thought can influence other thought. The consequence is that Whitehead is a passing ripple on the great stream of philosophical thought. If his writings survive, it will be to afford a conundrum for philosophers as to what he meant.

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SCHOLASTIC DEFINITIONS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
PART II

The work of elaborating a scientific basic description of the Catholic Church was perfected during the century which followed the opening of the Council of Trent in 1545. The theologians of this period propounded several distinct questions about the content and the nature of the formulae which were employed as definitions of the Church. Out of the controversies which resulted from the various resolutions of these problems there came finally the teaching which is now incorporated into the fabric of Catholic ecclesiology.

The men who expounded the divinely revealed doctrine about the true Church of Jesus Christ had first of all to decide whether they should describe this society as the assemblage of those who possess the true faith or whether they should designate it as the organization of those who profess this faith. St. Peter Canisius came out bluntly with the teaching that the Church is the society of those who profess the faith of Jesus Christ. St. Robert Bellarmine not only adopted this conclusion, but also presented evidence to show that any other teaching was ultimately incompatible with the doctrine of the Church's visibility. Yet, during this golden age of ecclesiology, such theological stalwarts as Matthew Galenus and Francis Sylvius held that the Church could only be defined as the congregation of those who actually have the divine faith. The great Francis Suarez insisted upon the possession of divine faith as a requisite for membership in the Church in his *Disputatio de Ecclesia*, one of his earlier writings. In a later work, however, he advanced a definition more in conformity with the teaching of St. Robert.

Distinct from this question, yet not altogether independent of it, was the problem of a separate definition to apply to the Church of the New Testament. As far as we can see, all of the early ecclesiologists taught that the Church, as an existent human society, had come into being during the lifetime of our first parents. Even St. Robert Bellarmine, the most influential of all the ecclesiologists, taught that "our Church has lasted from the beginning of the world up to now, or, if we speak of the status of the New Testament, it has lasted for 1577 years, from Christ to our own time."[1]

[1] *De Controversiis Christianae Fidei adversus Huius Temporis Haereticos*, Tom. I (Ingolstadt, 1586). *Quartae Controversiae Generalis Liber Quartus, De Notis Ecclesiae*, cap. 6, col. 1347.

The late sixteenth and the early seventeenth century ecclesiologists were faced with the task of showing the interrelations between a type of definition which was expected to describe the Church, as it had existed since the first days of the human race, and the kind of formula which was meant to designate only the Church according to the status of the New Testament. Melchior Cano's attempt to distinguish between these two sorts of description was challenged successfully by St. Robert Bellarmine, on the ground that Cano's teaching tended to imply the simultaneous existence of two Churches of Jesus Christ at the present time. Dominigo Bannez' terminology was much like that of his eminent fellow Dominican. Gregory of Valentia was among the first to teach that the formula which applied to the Church of the New Testament was merely a more restricted type of definition. Gregory also offered a most extensive definition of the Church, one which was fitted to describe the Church as a society including the blessed in heaven and the souls in purgatory as well as the faithful on earth.

The third problem which the theologians of this period had to solve revolved around the question of defining the Church in function of the Holy Father, the Vicar of Christ on earth. St. Peter Canisius brought this problem to the attention of ecclesiologists with the definitions which appeared in two of his catechisms. Matthew Galenus opposed this type of formula, which was adopted, however, by Dominigo Bannez, and St. Robert Bellarmine. The kind of definition sponsored by St. Peter Canisius, Bannez, and St. Robert came to be adopted almost universally in the traditional literature of Catholic theology. We can follow this development by examining the writings of some of the great ecclesiologists of that time.

MELCHIOR CANO

The brilliant Dominican Bishop, Melchior Cano (+1560), evolved a complicated and highly scientific explanation for the definition of the Church. He sedulously taught that the term *ecclesia* signified a convocation, but insisted, as had James Latomus, that the invitation was from God Himself. St. Isidore of Seville had popularized the statement that the Church was called an *ecclesia* or convocation because she invited all men to membership.[2] Cano taught that the term alluded to the fact that men were members of the Church, not by reason of any intrinsic worth on their own part, but because of the

[2] *Etymologiarum Liber Octavus*, cap. 1, in *MPL*, 82:293.

sublime goodness of God, Who favored them with a call to dwell within His city. For the great Spanish theologian, the Church is fundamentally the multitude which is gathered together in the faith and by the calling of Christ.

He acknowledged that the name Church sometimes applied to the congregation of both men and angels, but he declared that it was his intention to deal only with the Church militant, "the assembly of the faithful in the *status viae*."

Cano dealt in a highly individual fashion with the distinction between the definition of the Church as it has existed from the time of our first parents and that definition which applies strictly to the society instituted by our Lord. Almost alone among the classical theologians, he wrote in such a way as to give the impression that these two definitions applied to two co-existent societies.

> The Church can be understood in two ways. First there is that which is composed of the congregation of all the faithful from the beginning of the world until the end. It is thus that St. Thomas, in IIIa, qu. 8, art. 3, and all of those who say that the Church is the same now as it was in the people of the Jews under the law of Moses, and long ago in good men under the law of nature, speak of the Church. The catechumens are most truly members of the Church in this sense. For this [Church] is distinguished, not by the sacrament of baptism, but by faith, which has always set the people of God apart from the assemblies of infidels.
>
> Then that which is gathered together in the name of Christ through baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, and which properly constitutes members and parts of the Church, and which distinguishes the Church of Christ from the synagogue, is called the Church. The catechumens are not parts of this Church. All of those are parts [of this Church] who have the character of Christ through baptism, unless they have been cast out by the public judgement of the Church after manifest heresy.[3]

In after years St. Robert Bellarmine criticized this teaching of Melchior Cano.

> Melchior Cano says that catechumens can be saved because, although they are not of the Church which is properly termed Christian, they are still of that Church which embraces all the faithful from Abel until the end of the world. But this does not seem satisfactory because, since the advent of Christ, there is no Church other than that which is properly called Christian.[4]

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[3] *De Locis Theologicis*, Liber IV, cap. 2, in the *Opera Theologica* (Rome, 1900), I, 199 ff.

[4] *De Ecclesia Militante*, cap. 3, in *De Controversiis Christianae Fidei adversus Huius Temporis Haereticos* (Ingolstadt, 1586), I, col. 1266.

There is some doubt that Melchior Cano intended to each that there were actually two co-existent Churches, one of the faithful, and the other of the baptized. He may have meant merely to explain two definitions of the Church current in his own time, allowing his readers to choose between them. He was correct in pointing out the strict implications of these views. Thus Francis Suarez, who held exclusively to the formula *congregatio fidelium* as a definition of the Church, actually insisted that catechumens are members of this society, and that occult heretics are not.[5] On the other hand, St. Robert Bellarmine, who held for the second type of definition, denied that catechumens are members, and taught that occult heretics are within the Church until they are expelled, or until they leave this organization through public apostacy.[6] Certainly, Melchior Cano himself leaned towards the second type of definition.

The tendency which St. Robert censured in the *De Locis Theologicis* exists even in modern theological literature. According to Christian Pesch, the Church which can rightly be said to have existed from the beginning of the world is the Communion of Saints, the Church in the broadest sense of the term. "It is not that which we understand when we speak of the Church as a society instituted by Christ."[7] Both Dieckmann and Gruden join with Pesch in teaching, against the warning of St. Robert, the co-existence of two Churches since the public life of our Lord.[8]

BRIEFER FORMULAE

Peter Soto (+1563), another of the great lights of the Dominican order in Spain, and a professor of theology at Oxford during the reign of Queen Mary, used another definition of the Church intended to apply to the faithful since the beginning of the world. Soto, like Turrecremata and the author of the *Glossa*, introduced the notion of the worship of the true God into his formula. According to him, the Church is "the congregation of all men who agree in the true faith

[5] Cf. *Opus de Triplici Virtute Theologica* (Lyons, 1621), Tract. I, Disp. 9, sect. 1, pp. 156–62.

[6] Cf. *op. cit.*, chaps. 3, 10.

[7] *Praelectiones Dogmaticae*, Tom. I, Editio 6a et 7a (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1924), no. 311, p. 218.

[8] Cf. Dieckmann, *De Ecclesia Tractatus Historico-Dogmatici*, Tom. II (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1925), no. 935, pp. 235 f. Gruden, *The Mystical Christ* (St. Louis and London: B. Herder Book Co., 1936), pp. 160 ff.

and in the worship of the one God, from the beginning of the world until its end."[9]

John Hessels (+1566), the theologian frequently cited as John of Louvain, used a formula which described the true Church in terms of its purpose. "The Church is the congregation of men, called together by the Holy Ghost in order that Christ's merits may be communicated to it."[10]

The Louvain doctor, Francis Sonnius (+1576), wished to describe the Church in function of the divine teaching and the Sacraments rather than in terms of the virtue of faith itself. He spoke of the Church of Christ as consisting of those "who are associated as one people by the word of God and by the Sacraments of the Christian faith."[11] Where Sonnius had stressed the unity of the people, the great Cardinal Stanislaus Hosius (+1579) preferred to insist upon the concept of the Body of Christ in his formula. Hosius defined the Church as "the congregation of the faithful, one body, compacted out of many members, whose Head is Christ."[12] The brilliant and fiery Englishman, Nicholas Sander (+1580), used two basic concepts of the Church in his masterpiece, *De Visibili Monarchia Ecclesiae*.[13] His contemporary, the Jesuit martyr, St. Edmund Campion (+1581), used the old formula *coetus fidelium*.[14]

ST. PETER CANISIUS

St. Peter Canisius (+1597) offered two great definitions of the Church. In the first, which appeared in his *Summa Doctrinae*

[9] *Assertio Catholicae Fidei Circa Articulos Confessionis Nomine Illustrissimi Ducis Wirtenbergensis Oblatae per Legatos Eius Concilio Tridentino* (Cologne, 1555), *Sectio de Ecclesia*. (Neither the sections nor the pages of this edition are numbered.)

[10] *Brevis et Catholica Symboli Apostolici Explicatio* (Louvain, 1562), cap. 51, p. 23v.

[11] *Demonstrationes Religionis Christianae ex Verbo Dei* (Louvain, 1556), Tract. 8, cap. 1, p. 447.

[12] *Confessio Catholicae Fidei Christiana*, cap. 30. In the *Opera Omnia*, I, 69.

[13] This book was published at Louvain in 1571. It is one of the most interesting works of the period. Sander set out to prove that the *Civitas Dei*, which is the Catholic Church, was instituted by our Lord as a monarchical society, that this monarchy was prefigured in the City of God before the advent of Christ, and that since the public life of our Lord, it has continued to exist and to act as a monarchical institution, despite the opposition of the *Civitas Diaboli*, which comprises heretics and schismatics, along with other infidels. At the beginning of the fifth book, (p. 144 ff.), Sander insists on the dignity of this City of God as the *Corpus Christi*.

[14] *Rationes Decem, Quarta Ratio, Natura Ecclesiae*. In the edition, *Ten Reasons* (St. Louis: B. Herder, and London: Manresa Press, 1914), p. 48.

Christianae, he spoke of the Church as "the society (*universitas*) of all those who profess the faith and the teaching of Christ, which [society] He, the Prince of pastors, delivered to Peter the Apostle and to his successors to nourish and to govern."[15] The second formula, contained in the *Institutiones et Exercitamenta Christianae Pietatis*, describes the Church as "the congregation of all those professing the faith and the teaching of Christ, which [congregation] is governed by the one and supreme head and pastor, after Christ, on earth."[16]

One of the first to take issue with the definition contained in the *Institutiones et Exercitamenta Christianae Pietatis*, which, incidentally, quickly became the most popular definition of the Church, was the famed Douai professor, Matthew Galenus (+1573). Galenus objected to St. Peter's formula for many reasons, although he was careful to note that even he found not much wrong with this definition.[17]

He disliked the term *congregatio* on somewhat unusual grounds. Where other writers had opposed this word as an element in the definition of the Catholic Church because of its linguistic equivalence to *synagoga*, Galenus rejected it on the grounds that it implied a restriction of place incompatible with the fundamental catholicity of our Lord's Church. With the blunt assertion that many hypocrites make a profession, but still are not Christians, the Douai master refused to acknowledge that the Catholic Church could be designated as the society of those who *profess* the faith of Jesus Christ. He thought it unwise to include a reference to the Vicar of Christ in the formula for two reasons. The first was the fear that such a definition would not be accurate during the period intervening between the death of one Pope and the election of his successor. The other was the fear that such a definition would in some way run counter to the Pauline doctrine that bishops had been established to rule the Church of God. It is interesting to note that the formula of St. Robert Bellarmine, which became the classical description of the Church militant in the status of the New Testament, included a reference to the other "legitimate pastors" within the Catholic Church.

Galenus himself offered two definitions of the Church, one which was intended to designate the Church as it had been in existence since the time of Abel, and the other which was meant as a description of

[15] *Summa Doctrinae Christianae*, cap. 3. In Father Streicher's critical edition of the *Catechismi Latini S. Petri Canisii* (Rome and Munich, 1933), p. 8.

[16] *Institutiones et Exercitamenta Christianae Pietatis*, cap. 1. *Op. cit.*, p. 242.

[17] *Promptuarium Theologicum* (Lyons, 1600), catechesis 31, p. 98.

the Church of the New Testament. The Church, as existent since the beginning of the world is, according to Galenus, "the multitude of the faithful agreeing in one orthodox faith, and extended over all localities and all times." The Church of the New Testament, which Galenus saw as the subject of debate with heretics is "the multitude of faithful men, agreeing in the one apostolic faith and extended throughout all places."[18]

THE CATECHISM OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

The famous *Catechism of the Council of Trent*, which appeared in 1566, offered a general definition of the Church quite in accord with the principles which had been upheld by Galenus, Hessels and Melchior Cano. It employed the basic formula by which the Church was designated as the society of the faithful. It emphasized the notion of religion or the service of God as a constituent element in the definition. It spoke of the divine call or vocation to the fellowship within the Church and mentioned the purpose for which this society was founded.

> By the common custom of the Sacred Scripture, this word [*ecclesia*] is used exclusively to designate the Christian society (*rempublicam*) and the congregations of the faithful, who have been called through faith to the light of the divine truth and to the knowledge of God, in order that, leaving the darkness of ignorance and error, they may worship the true and living God in a good and holy manner, and serve Him with their whole heart. And, to sum this up in one formula, "The Church," as St. Augustine says, "is the faithful people spread throughout the world."[19]

The great Catechism offered definitions of the Church militant and of the Church triumphant. The latter, which includes the angels in heaven as well as the souls of the blessed who have passed from this world, is "the most glorious and happy assembly of the blessed spirits and of those who have overcome the world, the flesh and the wicked devil, and who enjoy eternal happiness, free and safe from the troubles of this world." The Church militant, on the other hand, is "the assembly of all the faithful who still live on earth." The Catechism hastens to assure its readers that the Church triumphant

[18] *Loc. cit.*

[19] *Catechismus Concilii Tridentini, Pii V Pontificis Maximi Jussu Promulgatus*, Pars I, art. 9, cap. 3. The reference to St. Augustine gives a faithful rendering of his teaching, but not in his exact words, since the *Ennaratio* in Ps. 149 is indicated.

and the Church militant "must not be considered as two Churches, but rather as two parts of the same Church."[20]

THOMAS STAPLETON AND ST. ROBERT BELLARMINE

While Turrecremata, Cano, and Galenus had devoted considerable effort to the construction and the justification of their definitions of the Catholic Church, it remained for the Englishman, Thomas Stapleton (+1598), and for the great Doctor of the Church, St. Robert Bellarmine (+1621), to produce new formulae which were the results of brilliant and original theological reasoning.

Stapleton, professor of theology at Douai and then at Louvain, and perhaps the most brilliant English speaking theologian in the history of the Catholic Church, offered two descriptions. The first shows his concern for the order within the Church, a concern which he shared with his older colleague, Nicholas Sander. According to Stapleton's first formula, "the Church is the society of those professing the name of Christ, gathered together in the unity of faith and of the sacraments, and legitimately ordered."[21] The author considered this formula as a more explicit statement of the teaching of St. Cyprian, that "the Church is the people united with the priest, the flock in union with its pastor."[22]

As a rule the older theologians had offered definitions of the Church which were meant to serve as a basis for the study of ecclesiology. Stapleton, however, conceived a different type of formula, one which would serve to sum up and express the fundamental theological conclusions about the Church, and which would serve most effectively to distinguish the true Church of Jesus Christ from the religious organizations which falsely claimed that title. Thus Stapleton mentions the notes and basic qualities of the Church in his definition. What is more important, he was brilliant enough to designate the true Church of Jesus Christ in the New Testament as the society which began in Jerusalem. Thus he made it clear that the Catholic Church existed during the public life of our Lord as the company of the disciples. This was a truth which amply deserved inclusion in the definition of the Catholic Church.

This is Stapleton's ultimate definition.

[20] *Op. cit.* cap. 8, 9.

[21] *Principiorum Fidei Doctrinalium Relectio Scholastica et Compendaria* (Antwerp 1596), *Controversia* I, Quaest. 5, art. 1, p. 125.

[22] *Ep.* 66, cap. 8, *CSEL*, 3, pars 2, 732.

The Church of Christ according to the status of the New Testament is the assembled multitude of those professing the name of Christ, starting from Jerusalem, and thence spreading throughout the entire world, flourishing among all nations, ever illustrious and visible, containing both good and evil, both elect and reprobate members, holy in its faith and in its Sacraments, apostolic in origin and succession, catholic in its amplitude, one in the connection and the order of its members, perpetual in its duration.[23]

St. Robert Bellarmine, on the other hand, set out to solve, once and for all, the problem which centered about the inclusion of the word faith, or the term profession of faith, in the definition of the Church. He took the distinction between two different kinds of forces which tend to unite a person within the Catholic Church, a distinction which had been recognized by Turrecremata and Driedo, and which had been fully elaborated by the great James Latomus, and applied this distinction to the basic description of the Catholic Church. The brilliant Jesuit Cardinal found that faith itself belonged to the internal bond of union in the Church of God. It was one of those graces which tend to make a man more perfectly one with our Lord in the society which He founded.

The profession of the faith, however, belonged to the outward communication or bond of union. It was a visible characteristic, which tended to establish a man as a member of a visible society. Latomus had taught that a man might remain within the Catholic Church through the possession of the outward bond of union, even though he had secretly destroyed his own faith. It was the genius of St. Robert to bring this teaching to bear on the construction of the definition of the Catholic Church. It was the teaching of St. Robert that

The Church is one, and not twofold, and this one true Church is the assembly of men united in the profession of the same Christian faith and in the communion of the same sacraments, under the rule of legitimate pastors, and in particular, that of the one Vicar of Christ on earth, the Roman Pontiff.[24]

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[23] Stapleton, *loc. cit.*, p. 126. This formula is practically identical with the one proposed in the earlier work, the *Principiorum Fidei Doctrinalium Demonstratio Methodica* (Paris, 1579), Controv. I, Lib. 4, cap. 6, p. 114.

[24] *De Controversiis Christianae Fidei adversus Huius Temporis Haereticos*, Tom. I, (Ingolstadt, 1586). *Quartae Controversiae Generalis Liber Tertius, De Ecclesia Militante*, cap. 2, col. 1263. In his Catechism, however, St. Robert taught a definition of the Church quite similar to that of St. Peter Canisius and Bannez. "The

Another Doctor of the Church, St. Francis de Sales (+1622), promptly adopted the formula of St. Robert as his own definition of the Catholic Church.[25] His example was followed by John Polman (+1649).[26] Since the middle of the nineteenth century, St. Robert's definition has become classical in Catholic ecclesiology.

Another distinguished convert to the teaching of St. Robert was the great Jesuit theologian, Francis Suarez (+1613). In his *Disputatio de Ecclesia*, Suarez had contended brilliantly and energetically that the Church ought not to be defined other than as "the congregation of the faithful believing in Christ."[27] He had carried his position to its logical conclusions. He taught that, because the Church is essentially the congregation of the faithful, the catechumens, possessing the faith, are properly designated as members of that Church. On the other hand, he denied that occult heretics could be counted as being within the Church at all.

Yet, in later years, after the *Controversies* of St. Robert had been published, he offered a concept of the Church quite in accordance with St. Robert's tenets. In his *De Religione*, Suarez taught that the Church could be considered from two different points of view. It could be taken from the material aspect, "in so far as it is a certain congregation of men, in which there are many temporal kingdoms disposed to natural ends and uses." We look upon the Church formally when we think of it "in so far as it is a certain spiritual and supernatural state (*respublica*) and one mystical Body, united by faith and its profession and by the Sacraments, under one Head, Christ, and under His vicar, tending to eternal happiness through means adapted to that end."[28]

BANNEZ, GREGORY OF VALENTIA, AND ADAM TANNER

The distinguished Dominican theologian, Dominigo Bannez (+1604), like St. Thomas before him, spoke of the Church as existing

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Church is a certain convocation and congregation of baptized human beings who profess the same faith and law of Christ in obedience to the Roman Pontiff." (*Christianae Doctrinae Latior Explicatio* [Antwerp, 1663], p. 41.)

[25] *Les Controverses*, part. I, chap. 2, art. 1. In the *Oeuvres*, Edition complète (Annecy, 1892), I, 43.

[26] *Breviarium Theologicum* (Paris, 1682), §115, p. 204.

[27] *Opus de Triplici Virtute Theologica* (Lyons, 1621). Tract. I, *De Fide*, Disp. 9, Sectio I, §1, p. 156.

[28] *Opus de Religione*, Pars II, Vol. III (Lyons, 1632), Tract. VII, Lib. I, cap. 2, §2, p. 9.

in heaven, in purgatory and on earth. He held that the entire society of angels and men, including both the *beati* and the *viatores*, could be designated as the *ecclesia*. Like Cano and Galenus, Bannez offered two definitions of the Church militant. As this society existed from the beginning of the world, and as it will continue until the last day, the Church militant is the "congregation of those who profess faith in God." Bannez taught, however, that the Church may be considered as a society which is brought together, not only by faith, but by baptism. Thus conceived, the Church militant of the New Testament is "the visible congregation of the baptized faithful, under one Head, Christ, in heaven, and under His vicar on earth."[29] It is interesting to note that Bannez' inclusion of the reference to the Holy Father in his formula made him, together with St. Peter Canisius and St. Robert Bellarmine, the object of attack by the erudite but viciously Gallican, John Launoy (+1678).[30]

The famous Jesuit theologian, Gregory of Valentia (+1603), was among the first to present an ordered exposition of definitions of the Church in an arrangement which has since become integrated into the fabric of traditional ecclesiology. Gregory set forth a most general definition of the Church, which described this society in so far as it includes the blessed in heaven and the souls in purgatory, as well as the faithful here on earth. A stricter formula applied to the Church as it has existed since the beginning of the world. The strictest definition applied exclusively to the Church of the New Testament. Although Gregory's arrangement of his definitions was eminently successful, the formulae themselves were too complicated to achieve outstanding popularity.

According to Gregory of Valentia's broadest type of definition, the Church is

> the multitude of those who have been gathered together by the grace of God's calling in the true worship of God and in the true and divinely granted knowledge of God, whether this knowledge is obscure, as it is in the case of

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[29] *Scholastica Commentaria in Secundam Secundae Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae* (Venice, 1588). *Commentarium* in qu. 1, art. 10, col. 153. Bannez gave two commentaries on this article. The first, just mentioned, was intended for beginners in the study of theology. The second section, containing the *fusiora commentaria*, carries the same formulae on col. 262.

[30] *Epist. XIII, ad Nicholaum Gatinaeum*, in the *Opera Omnia*, Vol. V, Pars II, pp. 665–96. Needless to say, Launoy's work is on the Index.

the knowledge of faith, or clear and manifest, as it is in the case of the blessed.[31]

In the two formulae which he applies to the Church militant, Gregory of Valentia endeavored to describe the Church in function of both the inward and the outward bonds of union. Thus he departed sharply from the type of definition proposed by St. Robert Bellarmine, who defined the Church in terms of the external bond only. Although Gregory's definitions differ in form from that of St. Robert, his fundamental teaching is identical with that of the Saint.

The Church, as it has existed since the time of our first parents, is defined by Gregory of Valentia as

> the multitude of men who are gathered together in this life in the true worship of God and the true but obscure knowledge of God through faith, partly by an inward bond of union through the worship and the faith themselves, and partly through an outward bond, through the external profession of these virtues.[32]

The strictest definition of the Church, that which applies to the Church militant of the New Testament is

> the multitude of men gathered together in this life by Christian faith, received in the Sacrament of baptism, some of whom, such as will always exist in this society, are held together by a bond of union which is both internal and external, since they are truly and sincerely in possession of this faith; and others of whom, as may sometimes be found in it, are held within this society by an outward bond of union alone, through the profession of the faith, without the faith itself.[33]

Another great Jesuit theologian, Adam Tanner (+1629), offered a much simpler formula as a most general definition of the Church. He described the Church, as it exists in heaven, in purgatory, and on earth as "a certain assembly of men called by God to the true knowledge and the worship of God and to the society of the true religion."[34] This formula stresses the knowledge of God, which can be either the preparatory awareness of divine faith or the definitive understanding

[31] *Commentaria Theologica*, Vol. III (Ingolstadt, 1603). Disp. I. *De Fide*, Quaest. I, Punct. 7, §14, col. 164.

[32] *Loc. cit.*

[33] *Ibid.*, col. 165.

[34] *Theologia Scholastica*, Tom. III (Ingolstadt, 1627). Disp. I, *De Fide*, Quaest. III, Dub. 2, col. 133.

of the beatific vision, the notion of corporate worship of God in Christ, and the concept of that fellowship which is to be found in the Communion of Saints.

Tanner accepted St. Peter Canisius' formula, set forth in the Saint's *Institutiones et Exercitamenta Christianae Pietatis*, as the correct description of the Church militant of the New Testament. However, he offered a formula which he considered a still more explicit statement of the truths presented by St. Peter Canisius. Tanner considered the Church, according to the status of the New Testament, to be "the assembly of the baptized faithful, rightly conjoined with the rest of the body and with its visible head on earth."[35]

MARTIN BECANUS AND JOHN WIGGERS

The Jesuit controversialist, Martin Becanus (+1624), and the Louvain commentator, John Wiggers (+1639), were each affected by the teaching of St. Robert Bellarmine. Without forming a definition of his own, Becanus distinguished three elements within the Church. The first was the multitude of men who make up this society. The second was the external rule, by which the prelates of the Church govern their own subjects, by teaching, exhorting, judging, and punishing them, and by administering the Sacraments to them. The third element consists in internal faith and charity.[36]

Wiggers constructed two definitions of the Church militant, the one general, applying to the Church as it has been in existence since the time of our first parents, and the other more restricted, and meant to designate the Church miltant of the New Testament. At the same time he insisted that the two definitions did not in any way imply an essential difference, since the Church of the New Testament was distinguished only by its status. Wiggers defined the Church militant in the wider sense as

> the assembly of men called to the true faith of the true God, which *it* holds inwardly, and bound together by the profession of that same faith and by fitting external acts of worship, under the legitimate superiors placed over its various members.[37]

Wiggers thus follows the tradition of his University, manifest in the teaching of John Driedo. The definition is constructed in such a way

[35] *Ibid.*, col. 134.
[36] *Manuale Controversiarum Huius Temporis* (Wuerzburg, 1623), p. 38
[37] *Commentaria de Virtutibus Theologicis* (Louvain, 1689), p. 97.

as to show that Wiggers held that those who believed in our Lord before His advent into the world did not constitute any one visible society.

Wiggers thus defined the Church militant of the New Testament. It is

> the assembly of men called to the Christian faith, which it holds inwardly, and united in the profession of the same faith and religion, and by the communication of the same Sacraments under the rule of the one Vicar of Christ on earth, the Roman Pontiff.[38]

It is interesting to note that Wiggers faced and overcame the same difficulty against which Gregory of Valentia had struggled. Both of these men wished to define the Church in function of its inward bond of union, rather than in the light of the external bond alone, as St. Robert had done. Both were eminently successful. Manifestly Wiggers set out to improve and clarify the formula of Gregory of Valentia. He achieved this effect by teaching that *the society* holds the true faith, and adding that it was not in the least necessary that every member of this society should have to possess true and internal faith in order to retain his membership.

THE CARDINAL DU PERRON

The Cardinal Jacques Davy du Perron (+1618) offers the example of another type of definition, used occasionally by Catholic ecclesiologists. The formula appears in his controversy against the King of England, James I. It represents an attempt on the part of the illustrious Cardinal to present a basic definition which would be acceptable to the Catholics and to the heretics alike. According to this definition, the Church is "the society of those whom God has called to salvation through the profession of the true faith, the sincere administration of the Sacraments and union with true pastors."[39] This description follows the general line laid down in St. Robert's *De Ecclesia Militante*. Through the mention of the true faith and the sincere administration of the Sacraments, it was supposed to be more acceptable to those who followed the Confession of Augsburg.

[38] *Loc. cit.*

[39] *Réplique à la response du sérénissime Roy de la Grande Bretagne*, chap. 8, p. 36.

JAMES MARCHANT AND FRANCIS SYLVIUS

Although he insisted that the Church could be considered as "the congregation of the faithful since the beginning of the world," James Marchant (+1648) accepted the definition of St. Peter Canisius as the proper description of the Church militant of the New Testament.[40]

The older tradition, manifest in the writings of Turrecremata and in the *Disputatio de Ecclesia* of Francis Suarez appeared again in the *Controversies* of Francis Sylvius (+1649), the greatest of the Douai theologians. Where St. Robert Bellarmine had bluntly declared that the formulae *congregatio fidelium* and *collectio catholicorum* were not properly definitions of the Church at all, Sylvius took them as the basic descriptions of the Church, as existing in the next life as well as in this one, and of the Church militant of the New Testament respectively.

Sylvius considered the formula "the society joined to Christ as its Head" as a more explicit statement of the *congregatio fidelium*. His explicit description of the Church militant, according to the status of the New Testament, was "the society of faithful men, ordered and united under one Head, Christ, and under His Vicar on earth."[41] This was merely an abbreviated version of the formula used by Dominigo Bannez. Sylvius rejected the definition of St. Peter Canisius, which was evidently the most popular formula in use during the early years of the seventeenth century, on the grounds that the true Church could not consist of those who merely professed the faith of Jesus Christ.

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[40] *Hortus Pastorum Sacrae Doctrinae Floribus Polymitus* (Lyons, 1668), Lib. I, Tract. IV, Art. 9, Lect. 3, p. 132.

[41] *Controversiarum Liber Tertius*, in the *Opera Omnia* (Antwerp, 1698), V, 237.

Answers to Questions

THE DIVINE OFFICE BEFORE THE BLESSED SACRAMENT

Question 1: When a priest wishes to gain the plenary indulgence for the recitation of the entire Office before the Blessed Sacrament, what additional conditions must he fulfill?

Question 2: Does a priest fulfill the condition of reciting the entire Office if he begins with Prime, and then, after completing the Hours of the current day, anticipates the next day's Matins and Lauds?

Question 3: Can this indulgence be gained if the recitation of the Office before the Blessed Sacrament is distributed over two days—Matins and Lauds on one day, the rest of the Office on the following day?

Answer 1: To gain the indulgence in question, besides reciting the entire Office before the Blessed Sacrament, either publicly exposed or reserved in the tabernacle, the priest (or tonsured cleric, or novice or student of a male religious institute) must fulfill the conditions of confession, holy communion and prayers for the intention of the Sovereign Pontiff (*Preces et Pia Opera*, nn. 674, 678). The first two conditions are to be interpreted according to Canon 931—that is, the confession can be made from the eighth day preceding to the eighth day following the day on which the Office is recited *coram Sanctissimo*; holy communion can be received from the preceding day to the eighth day afterward. However, confession as a condition for gaining this indulgence is not required of one who is accustomed, unless legitimately prevented, to confess twice a month or to receive holy communion at least five days a week. The third condition can be fulfilled by the recitation of one Our Father, Hail Mary and Glory be to the Father, with the freedom, according to Canon 934, 1, of reciting any other prayer in keeping with one's affection and devotion toward the Roman Pontiff (*Acta Ap. Sed.*, Vol. 25, p. 446).

Answer 2: Although in this case, portions of two days' Offices are recited, the indulgence could be gained, since the portions constitute *an entire Office*, and thus fulfil the condition laid down in the official grant of this indulgences—*integrum divinum Officium.*

Answer 3: This indulgence may be gained even if the recitation of the

Office before the Blessed Sacrament is distributed into different portions (*Preces et Pia Opera*, n. 678), and there is no reason why this could not be done on two consecutive days, in the manner described by the questioner. In this event, the second day would be regarded as the day to which the indulgence is affixed, for the application of Canon 931, 1.

PASCHAL COMMUNION WITHOUT FASTING

Question 1: A pregnant woman who for several months finds it impossible to fast for any length of time after rising in the morning is in consequence unable to receive Holy Communion. Would it be permitted to give her Holy Communion once in the course of the Easter season, despite the fact that she has broken her fast, so that she may satisfy the paschal precept? Or, can some other solution be suggested?

Answer: There is a solidly probable opinion that one who is unable to fast, yet does not come under one of the recognized exemptions from the eucharistic fast (e.g. danger of death, confinement to bed for a month, special dispensation) may receive Holy Communion without fasting once in the course of the Easter season. For, the annual communion is prescribed by a divine-ecclesiastical law, whereas the obligation of observing the eucharistic fast is merely ecclesiastical (Damen, *Theologia Moralis*, Vol. II, n. 164; Cappello, *De Sacramentis*, Vol. I, n. 517). Of course, care should be taken that danger of scandal be removed. Moreover, if it is possible to give such a person, still fasting, Holy Communion shortly after midnight, this course would be preferable, since the law determining the time when the Blessed Eucharist may be administered requires only a reasonable cause for an exception (Canon 867, 4).

DIFFICULTIES ABOUT EXTREME UNCTION

Question 1: If a priest is anointing a sick person with the intention of giving all the anointings, but finds, after anointing the hands, that for some good reason he cannot anoint the feet, is there any reason for doubting the validity of the sacrament?

Question 2: Supposing in the same circumstances the priest discovered, after giving the first four anointings, that he could anoint neither the hands nor the feet: is there any reason for doubting the validity of the sacrament?

Answer 1: These questions centre about the difficult problem as to just when, in the administration of Extreme Unction, the essence of the

sacrament is given. Of course, Extreme Unction *can* be given with a single anointing on any sense, at least if a general form is used, such as is the prescribed *forma brevior* (Canon 947, 1). But from this it does not follow necessarily that in the ordinary conferring of this sacrament it is essentially completed with the first anointing—the anointing of the eyes with a prayer for the remission of sins committed by the sense of sight. In fact, it seems quite probable that it is only after the fifth anointing that the essential sacramental grace is given. For it is only then that the anointing prayers prescribed by the ritual have covered all the types of sins that the person could have committed, so that it can be said that the anointing of his body has been essentially completed. The anointing of the feet adds only to the *integrity* of the sacrament, as is evident from the facility with which the Church dispenses from this anointing (Canon 947, 3), and also from the fact that any sins committed *per gressum* have already been included in some manner in one of the preceding anointings. Accordingly, the priest who would start with the intention of giving all six anointings, but would decide to omit the sixth only after giving the fifth need have no doubt about the validity of the sacrament, as long as his general intention is to anoint according to the mind of the Church (Kilker, *Extreme Unction*, St. Louis: Herder, 1927, pp. 45 f.). Nevertheless, as a general rule the priest should find out before beginning to anoint whether or not he can give all the prescribed six anointings.

Answer 2: According to the probable view just expounded, Extreme Unction is not essentially administered until the hands have been anointed. From this it would follow that the priest who would discover in the course of the anointings that he could not anoint the hands would run the risk of not giving the sacrament if he would do nothing to supply the defect. Accordingly, he would be bound to take measures to make certain the administration of the sacrament. The most practical course would be to add an anointing on the forehead, with the general form, and with the intention of giving the sacrament on condition that it has not already been conferred. In the event that the priest discovers beforehand that he cannot give one or more of the first five anointings on the proper members (at least one of each pair) or on a part of the body sufficiently proximate (*Rit. Rom., De Extrema Unctione*, Cap. 1, n. 19), it would be best to give the forehead anointing absolutely with a general form, and then to add whatever particular anointings are possible.

FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.SS.R.

BENEDICTIONS DURING THE CORPUS CHRISTI PROCESSION

Question: It seems to be the general custom to have a number of altars along the route of the procession of the Blessed Sacrament at which the procession halts and Benediction is given. Is there any limit to the number of such altars? I have always understood that three was the maximum.

Answer: It will be in the nature of a surprise to many priests to learn that *no* Benedictions of the Blessed Sacrament are contemplated at altars along the course of the *Corpus Christi* procession. The *Rituale Romanum* (Tit. IX, Cap. v), in its directions for the conduct of this procession, says nothing about the occasional halting of it for the purpose of giving a series of Benedictions. The *Caeremoniale Episcoporum* (II, xxxiii, 22) permits the procession to stop at one or two altars *en route*, evidently for the purpose of providing some rest for the celebrant. At each of these altars, the Blessed Sacrament is incensed and the oration, *Deus qui nobis sub Sacramento*, is chanted but nothing is said about Benediction. Martinucci (II, xxxv, 8), distinctly excludes Benediction at these altars of repose, providing merely for the *Tantum ergo*, the incensing, and the oration of the Blessed Sacrament. Strictly speaking, therefore, Benediction is not to be given until the return of the procession to the church from which it set out, as the climax of the entire function. However, the Sacred Congregation of Rites (2609; 3621, *ad* 3) allows Benediction to be given before leaving these altars to continue the procession, provided such is a very old custom (*vetustissima consuetudo*) and limits the number of such halts and Benedictions to two. In the United States, the usual practice is to give Benediction on these occasions, restricting them to two, but the *Baltimore Ceremonial*, an official guide in this country, does not think that the custom here qualifies as *vetustissima* and so directs that the procession continue from the altars of repose without Benediction (5th ed. 1882, p. 207).

WILLIAM J. LALLOU.

Book Reviews

THE PRIEST IN THE EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL. Compiled by The Most Reverend Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Archbishop of Laodicea, Apostolic Delegate to the United States. Paterson, N. J., St. Anthony Guild Press, 1944. Pp. xii + 119. $1.00.

"The thought of St. Paul," writes the Most Reverend Apostolic Delegate to the United States in his Foreword, "is majestic and profound. His expressions, breathing both attractiveness and strength, are, so to speak, spiritual slogans. They echo through the world like trumpet calls; they set forth programs of life and action, and no matter how extensively they may be commented on, they always provide food for new thought" (p. ix).

The Priest in the Epistles of St. Paul is a collection of well over two hundred passages from the Apostle dealing with the dignity and duties of the priesthood. The texts are grouped into sixteen chapters, each bearing on some particular aspect of the sacerdotal life.

To the texts themselves Archbishop Cicognani has appended brief commentaries, emphasizing their religious significance and practical application. These short notes are of the utmost value; and they are, for all their unassuming simplicity of expression, quite obviously the fruit of deep scholarly penetration into the sense of the Apostle's inspired words, and of devout reflection on their spiritual implications.

Priests in search of a satisfactory aid in mental prayer will most certainly welcome this small volume. The inexhaustible fecundity of the Pauline thought makes it an ideal foundation for meditation, and Archbishop Cicognani's commentary is a splendid guide. Take, for example, the first text and development under the sub-heading "Prayer":

> *Sine intermissione orate. In omnibus gratias agite; haec est enim voluntas Dei in Christo Jesu, in omnibus vobis* (I Thess. 5: 17, 18).
>
> Prayer lifts the mind to God and unites us to Him. Prayer must be uninterrupted in the sense that it maintains us always in close union with God. It must be accompanied by thanksgiving. If this duty of thanksgiving binds all the faithful, then with still greater reason does it extend to the priest. In the genuine sense of the term, his life is Eucharistic. Through the power conferred on him in ordination, he consecrates the Holy Eucharist—and "Eucharist" means "the giving of thanks." Our Lord gave thanks to the Father when He instituted the Blessed Sacrament; the Mass is the most perfect expression of gratitude to God (p. 19).

This book should find an honored place in the devotional library of every American priest and seminarian. Those who have been called to the service of the Master have genuine reason to be grateful to the Most Reverend

Apostolic Delegate for having provided them with such a rich spiritual treasury.

E. D. BENARD.

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC CHURCH: 1785–1943. By the Reverend John Paul Cadden, O.S.B., M.A., S.T.L. (The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology, Number 82.) Washington, D. C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1944. Pp. xi + 122. $1.00.

The title of this book is intriguing to the Church historian. Examination of its subject-matter reveals that the book is valuable to those of the craft. The author has at once shown ability of his own and the wisdom of profiting from the prudent and ingenious direction of Monsignor Guilday. For the prodigious work of Monsignor Guilday in the field of the Historiography of the Catholic Church in America makes that subject almost synonymous with his name.

This book is the first of a work of three parts. The problem it essays to solve revolves around the fact that the literature of the Church in America has long remained unanalyzed and uncatalogued. Needless to say, such a condition created time and again well-nigh insurmountable difficulties to generation after generation of Church historians. To see the promise of the solution of this problem must evoke a great act of gratitude from all Church historians to Dr. Cadden and his illustrious *Maestro*, Monsignor Guilday; for the former is quick to acknowledge the debt he owes to the latter, who by his foresight and energy over a long period of years has been preparing the way for the publication of this much needed book.

This volume treats of A) American Catholic Historiography: 1785–1884; B) John Gilmary Shea; C) Catholic Historical Societies; D) American Catholic Historiography: 1884–1915; E) American Catholic Historiography: 1915–1943. Each chapter is a well-rounded and direct treatment of its subject. Chapter I concerns itself with the literature of the first century of the Church's existence in America. In Chapter II a highly merited tribute is paid John Gilmary Shea. Catholic Historical Societies are listed and their work satisfactorily evaluated in Chapter III. The second period of the historiography of the Church in America is well treated in Chapter IV. And the concluding chapter brings the subject matter to 1943. In this chapter are listed all the monographs completed in the Seminar of Monsignor Guilday: and what a notable array they are! Then, too, a deserved compliment is paid to the great achievements of Dr. Richard J. Purcell, who in the field of American History since 1920 has been training students in refined critical methods.

Historical students of the Catholic Church in America will look forward with keen interest and happy anticipation to the completion of a work so

auspiciously and effectively inaugurated by the author of this first completed volume of the projected three volume Historiography. This reviewer would suggest, however, in the completed work a title such as *Historiography of the Catholic Church in America* be used. In the title, *Historiography of the American Catholic Church*, to the reviewer there is an unsavory reminder of an heretical sect, which calls itself the "American Catholic Church."

FINTAN WALKER.

THE FOUR GOSPELS. By Dom John Chapman. New York, Sheed and Ward, 1944. Pp. vi + 85. $1.25.

The fact that this book was written by so eminent an authority as Dom Chapman naturally leads the prospective reader to anticipate a work of genuine scientific and literary worth. His expectations will be amply fulfilled. It is a brief, non-technical, yet scholarly discussion of the date, authorship, characteristics, and mutual relationship of the four Gospels.

The author defends the traditional Catholic position with masterly skill and without compromise. Thus, the Protestant view that the Gospel of St. Matthew was based on St. Mark and is later than St. Luke is shown to be paradoxical. Dom Chapman maintains that St. Matthew wrote first, "so that Mark's gospel is really (as St. Augustine says) an abbreviation or extract from Matthew and that lastly Luke used Mark as his principal authority. This view tallies completely with the ancient evidence" (pp. 18f.).

Dom John Chapman recommends the reading of St. Mark's Gospel "with the idea of finding in it St. Peter's own descriptions of the life he lived for so short a time in Galilee with the Son of God whom he loved passionately" (p. 32). The peculiarities of St. Luke's Gospel are explained lucidly and its merits set forth with warm admiration. The "Q" document postulated by modern critics is rejected. The reader will be especially pleased with the treatment accorded to St. John's Gospel. The author gives a detailed exposition of the internal and external evidence showing that the Fourth Gospel was written by St. John the Apostle.

Professional men and women as well as students in our colleges and universities will find *The Four Gospels* useful and interesting. It will supply them with the information which every educated Catholic should have concerning the Gospels and will enable them to meet the objections of their non-Catholic acquaintances. Priests will read this book with profit to refurbish and supplement their seminary training. They will welcome it as a valuable addition to their library of apologetical literature.

The utility of the book has been enhanced by the addition of an appendix containing the chief patristic texts bearing on the subject-matter and the Responses of the Biblical Commission on problems connected with the Gospels. We regret that there is no index.

MICHAEL J. GRUENTHANER, S.J.

PAUL OF TARSUS. By Rt. Rev. Joseph Holzner. Translated by Rev. Frederic C. Eckhoff. St. Louis and London, B. Herder Book Co., 1944. Pp. vi + 502. $5.00.

A publisher's note informs the reader that this book is a translation of *Paulus, sein Leben und seine Briefe*. This title gives the reader a somewhat more accurate idea of the contents, since it informs him that in addition to the life of St. Paul the author discusses at their proper place in the course of the biography the thirteen letters of St. Paul. The Epistle to the Hebrews is not treated, since the author maintains that it was not written by St. Paul, although it expresses his thoughts.

Monsignor Holzner takes the very sketchy and scattered information supplied by the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of St. Paul, and drawing on other sources of information for background and additional data, gives us a consecutive, entertaining and life-like narrative of the great Apostle of the Gentiles from his birth at Tarsus to his martyrdom at Rome.

The author abhors that manner of presenting the saints which depicts them as "impossible wax figures" in an artificial light. Instead he loves realism, and has succeeded well in giving us a vivid, life-like picture of St. Paul and of the world in which he labored, suffered and died. The translator has acquitted himself with distinction.

This is just the publication we have been yearning for ever since last year when we read a couple of books on St. Paul presenting a revoltingly distorted picture of that great man. Here we have the antidote to that poison,—a biography based on fact, interestingly, entertainingly, and competently told. Every priest, every religious, every man and woman of the laity should read this book. All will derive information, edification, inspiration and pleasure from Monsignor Holzner's account. It will enable them to appreciate more fully that greatest figure in world history after Jesus Christ, and to read more understandingly his imperishable writings.

JOSEPH L. LILLY, C.M.

WHAT IS EDUCATION? By Edward Leen, C.S.Sp., M.A., D.D., D.Litt. New York, Sheed and Ward, 1944. Pp. 288. $3.00.

What is Education? is a valuable contribution to the ever-growing literature on Catholic education. As in his other writings, Dr. Leen gives evidence of deep thought, great erudition and considerable research. In support of his views, he quotes liberally from Plato, Aristotle, Newman, Pius XI and many other ancient and modern authorities. To the casual reader, some of his statements may seem startling, e.g. "Democracy rightly understood is nothing else than aristocracy" (p. 11); "It would be a mistake to think that the education of Christians by Christians is necessarily a Christian education" (p. 6), etc., but if one reads carefully what follows, he cannot but agree with him.

The object of education is human happiness. One requisite for this is economic security. Therefore, one part of education must prepare the child for making a living. But the more important part is to achieve an excellent human life, such as the inner promptings of his own soul and the Author of his being call for. It is obvious that no proper scheme of education can be conceived where there is not a right understanding of the ultimate aim of life. A false religion or a false philosophy involves a false theory of man's existence and, therefore, can not be the origin of a perfect training for youthful minds and wills.

The work of the schools consists in the perfecting of the intellect by various studies, and in moral training. In the latter, example is more potent than precept. The character of the students is slowly formed by the school's prevailing tone and atmosphere, the creation of those who are placed over it to guide its destinies. One must be good in order to form others to goodness.

There can be little variation in the moral training of the schools, but there must necessarily be great variation in the subjects that prepare the student to make a living. In the early stages, education should be liberal, for one should first be a man before he prepares for a profession. The author thinks that too much emphasis is placed on mathematics and experimental science in the non-technical courses. Some of the time might be more profitably given to cultural subjects. He condemns some of the theories about repression as opposed to the doctrine of original sin and human experience. He recognizes the importance of properly directed athletics in the formation of character, but he thinks that strenuous competitive games are physically and morally injurious to girls. Dr. Leen is a strong advocate of the ancient classics as the expression of the thought and ideals of ancient civilization. However, these classics, being pagan, contain much that is false or immoral. The teacher must carefully counteract the possible effect on the student. This can be done by adding to the course selections from the early Christian writers, whose Latin compares very favorably with the classics. Besides, they will form a connecting link between the classic period and the Renaissance.

Christian doctrine must occupy a central position in the plan of Christian education. All other courses must get their inspiration from it. Much has been done in recent years to improve our textbooks of Christian doctrine, but the author thinks that what is needed is not so much a change of catechisms as a change of catechists. His further elucidation should be inspiring and stimulating to teachers of religion.

The conscientious Catholic educator will find in *What is Education?* much food for thought and great help and encouragement in his difficult work.

VERY REV. BONIFACE REGER, O.S.B.

AUSTRIAN AID TO AMERICAN CATHOLICS: 1830–1860. By Benjamin J. Blied. Milwaukee (publ. by author), 1944. Pp. 205. $2.50.

Father Blied, of the staff of St. Francis Seminary, St. Francis, Wis., wrote this volume as his doctoral dissertation at Marquette University. The collaborators in his chosen field—the part played by German-speaking Catholics, here and abroad, in the development of our country and the Church that is ours today—are all too few indeed.

Confining his study to the Austrain contribution to the Catholic Church in the United States, the author further takes the founding of the Leopoldine Society (1829) as a convenient and chronologically true starting point. The extraordinary activity of this society, inaugurated solely to help the American missions, lay principally during the following three decades; for which and other reasons 1860 is also an acceptable *terminus ad quem*.

As Dr. Blied intimates in his preface, his study does not concern itself so much with the institutions, for example, the churches and the all-important schools, sustained and invigorated on the frontier, notably in the Middle West; but his is the record of a gallant little army of self-effacing and hard-working priests (and nuns followed them soon), of which *infelix Austria* may well be proud. The story told of these Austrian pioneers includes seculars and religious, men such as Baraga, Mrak, and Neumann (these among others became bishops), missionaries, such as Pierz, Kundek, Weninger, and Tschenhens, and with these the scholars Salzmann, Raffeiner, and Inama, gifted and unique characters such as Cebul and Hammer, and many others.

Incidentally: it is stated on p. 138 that Father Hammer, also a poet, painter, and composer who sacrificed none of his full measure of Austrian *Gemütlichkeit* during his pastorate in Cincinnati on the Ohio, "contributed many an item" to the early volumes of the *Wahrheitsfreund*. I wonder if the author was aware of a most rare and interesting little volume, published anonymously: *Skizzen aus Nord-Amerika*, (Augsburg: B. Schmidt'sche Buchhandlung, 1845. 12mo, pp. viii + 296). At least seven of the items referred to by Dr. Blied are incorporated in the book, which certainly is by Father Hammer.

These men and their apostolic labors cover one half of the record: it is complemented by the sum-total of prayers and the many millions of kreutzers, contributions made weekly by the Catholic home folk in Austria, the members of the Leopoldine Society. Indeed, this is perhaps the brighter half of the record, inasmuch as this remarkable society was by no means wholly partial to the Austro-Hungarian-German mission front in America, but generously gave its support to the Irish laborers in the Vineyard as well.

This book is documented admirably throughout (note also the extensive "Selected Bibliography," pp. 185–196). Printing mistakes scarcely occur (p. 13, supply the preposition in "died Koeniggraetz"). The Vulgate-

Douay spellings should have been used for "Elijah" and "Zarephath" (p. 101). The author's antipathy for hyphenated words is carried too far: "all important" (p. 38), "far flung" (p. 40), "land hungry" (p. 63), "well being" (p. 90, where also correct "red skins" to "redskins"). Some discomfort is sensed, too, on reading of "the salvific light of the holy gospels" (p. 16), and of Father Hammer as "priorly mentioned" (p. 147). But these and other infelicities of language and method (for example, in the first part of the "Historical Prelude" it seems quite unnecessary to hark back all the way to the history of Christ and the first Christian centuries) detract very little from Dr. Blied's valuable and very interesting contribution to the history of the Church in the United States. We hope that he will continue his explorations in the Salzmann and Central Verein Libraries and similar collections of German-Americana, and that further monographs in this field of research will follow.

J. C. PLUMPE.

CLOWNS AND ANGELS. Studies in Modern French Literature. By Wallace Fowlie. New York, Sheed & Ward, 1943. Pp. 162. $2.50.

The outstanding features of these fine studies are psychological penetration, a broad perspective resulting from a wide knowledge of the literature of the Western world, and the Christian viewpoint from which are judged the attitudes of the authors and their creations.

Mr. Fowlie's analyses are worked out by a process of comparison and contrast, leading to a skillful definition of each author's work in the light of the author's own personality, of the production of his contemporaries both French and foreign, and of the best literary creations of the past. Stimulating and illuminating generalizations are thus arrived at concerning the creations of the poets Beaudelaire, Claudel, and Rimbaud, who are treated in the third part of the book, "The Poet's Creation," and of the novelists Gide, Mauriac, Proust, and Romains, grouped in the second part entitled "The Contemporary Hero."

The first part, "The Example of France," is a very brief survey of the most recent tendencies in French literature. Mr. Fowlie finds that such literary artists as Malraux, Giraudoux, Cocteau, and Gide are true to their heritage in being mainly concerned with the various aspects of man. The new art, he observes, "represents a defeat of all that was superficial and philosophically unsound in romanticism" (p. 16). He pays eloquent tribute to the spiritual values of France whose "comprehension of Catholicism has been special and and profound" (p. 19), and whose "mission has been (and will continue to be after the present world crisis has passed) to teach the meaning of the Christian principles of charity and justice" (p. 21).

The enigmatic title seems to be based on the contrast between the Romantic art which is "the study of the self that is not central in man" (p. 88), and

the art of the contemporary period in which "the ego of the artist is no longer content with the contemplation of its own imperfections" (p. 17). The clowns are the representatives of the "romanticism of self-analysis and self-pity" (p. 88); the angels those artists who deal with the eternal themes of "man as man" and of "man as artist" (p. 18).

ALESSANDRO S. CRISAFULLI.

Book Notes

In this year of the Silver Jubilee of the publication of the *Codex Iuris Canonici* there comes to hand the work of Reverend Ricardo Struve Haker, *Las Causales Canonicas del Divorcio*, (Bogota: Ediciones de "La Ruta," 1944. Pp. xvii + 173). For those who read Spanish, be they judges, lawyers, pastors, or confessors, this work will provide much information regarding the grounds for divorce *a mensa et thoro*. After setting forth the concept of indissoluble marriage and partial divorce, Fr. Struve takes up the grounds of adultery, apostasy, non-Catholic education of the children, criminal and infamous life, grave danger to soul or body, cruelty, and other grounds not specified in the Code, with copious footnotes which will be of great help to those who are unable to procure all of the books which a canonist usually desires to consult in these cases.

May I Keep Company, a 48-page pamphlet by the Rev. John J. Gorey, C.S.S.R., of Belfast, Ireland (Dublin: Juverna Press, 1944), proposes in story form some very practical points on what is permitted and what is forbidden to young couples before marriage. It also depicts in an inspiring manner the dignity and the holiness of Christian marriage. In these days when there is so much neglect of the virtues of chastity and modesty in the association of the sexes, the rules laid down by the author will undoubtedly appear too rigid to many, yet they are simply the application of Catholic moral principles. Particularly praiseworthy is Father Gorey's insistence on the obligation to avoid the proximate occasions of sin.

Since Cicero wrote his *De Oratore* in the fall of 55 B.C., it might seem that this *Review* is a little later than usual in commenting on a book. But the purpose of this note is merely to remark the excellent edition of the *De Oratore* now obtainable in "The Loeb Classical Library" series. The treatise is in two volumes, the first containing Books I and II of the *De Oratore*, and the second, Book III, together with *De Fato*, *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, and *Partitiones Oratoriae*. All priests, preachers by profession, should be interested in the *De Oratore* as one of the great source-books of rhetorical technique. The advantage of possessing the Latin text and the English translation on adjoining pages is obvious. The Rackham and Sutton translation in the Loeb edition is rather literal, but by no means stiff or unimaginative. ("Hae dicendi faces," for example, becomes "these rhetorical fireworks.") The books are published in the United States by the Harvard University Press and are priced, in the cloth binding, at $2.50 each.

The one-volume translation of the sixty-five year old classic *The Christ, The Son of God, A Life of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ*, by the Abbé Constant Fouard, (London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1944. Pp. xxvi + 347, with three maps. $2.00) has just been re-issued. Where the older one-volume translation was

printed in small type, two columns to a page, the new edition has been set in very readable type, and in full-page. It is a vast improvement over the older abridged translation.

The publishers candidly note that "a bibliography, extensive notes and appendices have been omitted in this edition." For some reason or other, publishers, as a race, seem obsessed with the notion that bibliographies and extensive notes are anathema to the American Catholic reading public. Fouard's critical annotations have become for the most part, quite outmoded, so their omission does little harm, although they contributed perhaps the major part of the value of *The Christ, The Son of God*. Less explicable is the omission of valuable notes from the recent translation of Cadiou's *La Jeunesse d'Origène*. We still recall the disappointment among Catholic scholars when the English version of Mersch's great *Le Corps Mystique du Christ* appeared with a changed and inaccurate title, and without the references which made the original study one of the best works in the field.

Strange to say, it was one of the greatest of the American Archbishops who, nearly a century ago, protested against the omission of references to sources in books being offered then to his countrymen. "We like to have chapter and verse for every thing," wrote the brilliant Martin John Spalding. "We value those historical books only, the margins of which are filled with quotations of the proper documents, and the writers of which give sufficient evidence that they have not taken these authorities at second hand, but have drunk deeply themselves at the fountain heads. We like books written after the manner of Lingard's History of England. There is at least some satisfaction in reading such works." (*Miscellanea: Comprising Reviews, Lectures, and Essays on Historical, Theological, and Miscellaneous Subjects* [Louisville, Ky., 1855], p. 19.)

The learned prelate derided Palmer's *Compendious Ecclesiastical History*, among other reasons, because the Oxford teacher was sparing in his use of references. He took great pride in announcing to his compatriots that the *Praelectiones Historiae Ecclesiasticae* by the Roman Professor, Father John Baptist Palma, suffered from no such defect. It is highly improbable that he would think that the cultural traditions he fostered among the American Catholics would be much improved by some recent translations.

The collection of papers read at the sessions of the National Liturgical Week, held in Chicago in 1943 (*National Liturgical Week 1943*, Ferdinand, Indiana: the Liturgical Conference, 1944. Pp. x + 182) covers a wide range of essays on the general topic of sacrifice. There is a treatment of the theological meaning of sacrifice and the application of the term to the activities of the Church and of the individual. There is likewise a practical consideration of the liturgical revival in city parishes, in rural districts and in army camps. A very sane introduction by the Most Reverend Archbishop of Chicago warns the promotors of liturgical movements against extravagant innovations and over-emphasis of the unimportant.

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